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Analysis of Perceptions of Natural Resource Planning in Four "Wicked" Situations
Advisor; Stephen F. McCool
The predominant planning model used in natural resource planning situations is termed
synoptic and based on a Progressive Era paradigm stressing a reliance on technology, the
maximization of efficiency and seeking an objective, apolitical orientation. Yet, natural
resource issues are often characterized as "wicked" problems in which goals are contested
and significant uncertainty exists regarding cause and effect relationships. New models
of planning based on social learning and a transactional approach appear prudent but are
infrequently used in these "wicked" situations.
This study examines planner's perceptions of the environment in which they operate and
their choice of planning models using a purposeful sample of twenty-eight individuals
involved in four plarming processes occurring at various spatial and temporal scales in
the northern Rocky Mountains (1. Bitterroot Ecosystem Grizzly Bear Recovery Process;
2. Glacier National Park General Management Plan; 3- Upper Clark Fork River Basin
Management Plan; 4. Blackfoot River Recreation Management Plan). Applying a
qualitative, interpretivist methodology based on in-depth interviews, the research details
the themes that emerge from the transcribed interviews. These data are also analyzed
using a quantitative approach to assess the relationship between the perceptions of the
planning environment and the preferred model of planning.
Results indicate that planners perceive the environment in which they operate as
constrained due to procedural obligations, the inflexibility of the organization and an
inability to identify and agree upon goals. In addition, the majority of planners recognize
systemic-level issues, those involving the values and paradigms within society, as
negatively affecting the planning environment. Paradoxically, while most plarmers
recognize that they are constrained by various issues, they continue to apply synoptic
models that are ill-suited to dealing with "wicked" problems. Several unexpected themes
emerge relating to the importance of trust in planning and the notion that in certain
circumstances, power held by individuals or organizations negatively affects the process.
The constraining factors identified by planners in this study ultimately suppressed
dialogue and did not allow for social learning to take place. The research provides
evidence of the need to investigate how and to what degree flexibility should be applied
in natural resource planning organizations in order to encourage innovative planning
techniques and address systemic-level issues.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Natural resource planning has entered an era of turmoil where goals are frequenth
contested, the scale of analysis has increased and significant uncertainty exists about the
effects of management actions. Increasingly, the academic, government and public
sectors have challenged the appropriateness of the use of particular planning models
when confronting natural resource planning situations. As Alexander (1996:45) observes
about contemporary plaiming situations, "...nothing is accepted; everything is
questioned."
These provocations parallel the development of ecosystem-based management as
a paradigm for natural resource planning. Ecosystem-based management is a holistic
approach to understanding what goods and services the natural world can produce and the
limitations in so producing. Biophysical and social components of ecosystems are linked
through a complex web of relationships existing at a variety of scales. While ecosystembased management relies heavily on science and technically based adaptive management
concepts, it recognizes that the synoptic (also termed rational-comprehensive) model of
planning dominating past natural resource planning efforts is no longer appropriate. The
synoptic model assumes a singular, well-defmed objective for which there is general
agreement and relies primarily upon the ability to measure and quantitatively model data
and interactions. Consequently, natural resource planning typifying this description tends
to be solely within the realm of modelers and technicians. Clark and Brown (1990:25)
argue that while such an approach "...might best show how to achieve a given end, it is
not a process for choosing ends." Choosing ends (i.e. goals) is arguably the dominant
natural resource planning challenge of the day. This challenge raises fundamental

questions that involve the character of the goods and services to be delivered from public
lands, the selection of social choice mechanisms used to make these decisions and the
role of the public in these mechanisms.
The contentious setting that now characterizes many natural resource planning
processes is exemplified by a growing public dissatisfaction with many of the methods
used by professional planners. This dissatisfaction has been expressed in many forms
including a lack of participation, animosity and distrust toward government agencies,
litigation and appeals that result from unacceptable plans and procedures and
occasionally even threats and violence toward government officials. Most recently, the
resignation of Humbolt-Toiyabe National Forest Supervisor Gloria Flora in the fall of
1999 because of alleged intimidation and harassment over a controversial road closure to
protect endangered species habitat has attracted national attention to the issue of "fedbashing" and the potential for violence directed toward professionals involved in natural
resource planning and management.

Unprecedented Planning Situations
Natural resource management problems have moved from the well-defined to the
"wicked" (Rittel and Webber 1973, Allen and Gould 1986, Shindler and Cramer 1999);
where goals are frequently multiple and competing, there is little scientific agreement on
cause-effect relationships, time and resources may be limited, needed information may
not exist, public opinion and values have become more diverse and increasingly, the
public seeks to become more involved in natural resource planning decisions. Further,
natural resource planners operate within an institutional framework that is both resistant

to change and which may no longer be appropriate to planning in this era. The traditional
synoptic approach to planning may in many natural resource situations actual))' lead to
more, not less, disagreement (Borrie and others 1998).
Considering that the science orientation of ecosystem-based management is
increasingly challenged, the practice of natural resource planning is recognized as
intrinsically a political task and the difficuh questions in natural resource planning "...are
ultimately questions of sociail choice and value judgments" (Clark and Stankey 1991:13).
Natural resource issues are commonly made up of a multiplicity of interests, a significant
amount of technical uncertainty and complexity, a decision-making environment that is
often portrayed as "zero-sum" affecting a large geographical and intellectual landscape
and requiring choices that balance short-term costs against long-term benefits that define
society's obligations to future generations (Yaffe 1994). In summary, there is multiplying
agreement that we are confronted with unprecedented planning situations (Friedmann
1993, Cortner and Moote 1999, Forester 1999) yet there continues to be a significant
reliance on the science and technology that typified planning in a different era.
Changing Character of Goods and Services
In order for natural resource planners to effectively plan and manage natural
landscapes, they must imderstand the changing characteristics of what goods and services
the public demands from these lands. The goods and services derived from publicly
administered lands are identified or measured primarily by social values and judgements.
These goods and services include commodity values, public use values, amenity values,
environmental quality values, ecological values, and spiritual values (Clark and others
1999). No longer are the goods associated with natural resoiorces viewed purely as
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commodities to be bought and sold and as Williams and Patterson (1999:143) assen.
"...many important meanings and values are not identified through exchange or market
transactions alone, if at all."
Planning processes designed to ensure the delivery of socially desired goods and
services are proving to be inappropriate given that these values seem to lie at the center of
natural resource management debates. This inappropriateness is a fimction of the
institutional firamework and the character of the problems facing natural resource
planners. At the same time, demands on natural resources have increased and diversified,
while the compatibility of various goods and services as defined by the public is
increasingly challenged. Consequently, the values that are not easily measurable or
quantifiable in these complex situations are often the most important component of
natural resource planning and management.
Political Nature of Natural Resource Planning
Given that the goods and services the public demands are based on dynamic and
often conflicting social values and judgements, public land planning is thus intrinsically
political. A top-down, decision-making process will inevitably create adversity and
contention in a value-laden arena. Allen and Gould (1986:22-23) describe "wicked"
problems as those "...that do not necessarily deal with systems where inputs, outputs, and
intermediate actions or reactions occur in a scientifically predictable manner ...[and
therefore] require nontraditional solutions ...[in which] science and analysis are of
secondary assistance to politics." Others note that in natural resource planning situations,
"...allocation and management decisions are inherently social and political rather than
technical because human relationships are involved ...[therefore] (P)lanning cannot

proceed efficiently unless agencies understand this context and develop mechanisms to
work effectively within it" (McCool and Cole 1997:76). Burchfield (1998:34) reiterates
in reference to the U.S. Forest Service (USPS) stating, "...until the agency can understand
that resource management is politics with science advisors, instead of science with
political meddlers, it will continue to stumble through costly new planning procedures
...the root of the problem is not that it has become too political; it is simply not political
enough." Thus, as Rittel and Webber (1973:169) assert, the plaimer must realize that
"...the expert is also a player in a political game, seeking to promote his private vision of
goodness over others'. Planning is a component of politics. There is no escaping that
truism." For these reasons, a civic-minded populace prepared and practiced in the art of
politics would seem more favored to successful resolution of the complex issues that
accompany nattxral resource planning.
Natural resource plarming processes have been criticized for both impeding public
participation and poorly engaging the public throughout the plarming process. Blahna
and Yonts-Shepard (1989:223) found that USFS planners tended to bury controversial
issues during the planning process rather than clearly identifying them to the public
stating, "...on most of the forests in this study there was not a partnership between the
forests and the public during the planning process, just latent adversarial relationships."
A review of the USFS between 1971 and 1993 reports a dramatic increase in
lawsuits and appeals in which most of the cases filed were designed to block activities
such as timber harvesting, roadbuilding, and pesticide spraying (Jones and Taylor 1995).
In complex, "wicked" natural resource planning situations, the public has resorted to
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acting antagonistically including nearly 100 incidents of violence or intimidation agamsi
USPS and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) employees in 1998 alone (Denson 1999).
While public dissatisfaction of the planning methods used in these imprecedented
natural resource planning situations remains unmistakable, little is done to incorporate the
public in a meaningful way so that not only a diversity of opinion can be adequately
represented, but also in an appropriate forum that encourages civic integration and
deliberation.

New Paradigms of Planning
Thompson and Tuden (1987) and Lee (1993) suggest that organizations are
confronted with several different types of planning settings depending upon the degree of
public agreement on goals and the level of scientific agreement about cause and effect
relationships. The appropriateness of alternative planning models to provide for a sound
foundation from which to plan will vary in each situation. While synoptic methods of
planning are appropriate when dealing with "tame" problems that involve agreement of
goals and a clear understanding of cause and effect relationships, "wicked" problems
require new methods of planning that accommodate a diversity of values and goals and
acknowledge the uncertainty of analysis.
It is now widely recognized that agencies managing natural resources must move
to a new paradigm of planning. Many suggest fundamental changes in institutional
design. Stankey and others (1999) maintain that a social learning model of planning,
where scientists, managers and the public jointly pursue settlements is most appropriate.
Friedmann (1993:483) asserts that planners should act as facilitators involved in linking
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knowledge to action while new fonns of planning need to be "...normative, innovative,
political, transactive and based on social learmng." Moote and others (1994) establish a
series of principles of ecosystem-based management, one of which recognizes a need for
collaborative processes that are currently not generally included in natural resource
planning. Machlis and others (1994) propose an ecosystem model that places questions
of human uses and values at the center of their approach. Innes (1996) presents a case for
plaiming through consensus building, yet based on the synoptic model. In short,
numerous individuals in diverse disciplines have expressed dissatisfaction with current
planning models and have proposed iimovations to expedite and improve the natural
resource planning process.
It is hardly surprising that contemporary natural resource plaiming is in a state of
disarray given that there exist some 80,000 units of government in the United States
(federal, state, county, municipal, special districts), that political power is discordantly
dispersed between these government agencies and non-government organizations, that
Congress largely appropriates budgets and sets policy for the public land agencies, that
there is remarkably little coordination between land managers who share administrative
boundaries, and that the creation of public lands was accomplished incidentally and with
little foresight (Yaffe 1994). Thus, realizing that planners are operating in an
environment in which the following is occurring;
1. A change has taken place regarding the characteristics of the goods and
services the public demands of public lands,
2. Politicized issues are approached with rational, science-based solutions.
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3. The planner's institutional structure is generally inflexible and resistant
to change,
4. The public is increasingly dissatisfied with synoptic planning processes.
5. Numerous planning models have been shown to ameliorate many of the
current contentious situations,
the following statement of research question is examined.

Statement of Research Question
The paradigms that natural resource planners hold toward the various
conventions, both formal and informal, of the planning process are constantly evolving;
therefore, understanding these paradigms is crucial to understanding the perceptions and
choices involved in natural resource planning. Such perceptions have considerable
impact on the success of natural resource planning processes because they guide the
planner's behavior in how planning will proceed, how values will be measured and
accounted for and how choices of land allocation and management actions will be
selected. Therefore, addressing these issues is both pertinent and potentially beneficial to
the academic, government and public sectors alike. Thus, this research seeks to answer
the question:
"How do natural resource planners perceive the current planning
environment and how does this affect their choice of planning models?"
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Objectives
In order to answer this question, several objectives have been developed. The
primary objective is to understand how natural resource planners view their task and the
factors affecting their perceptions of the planning environment and resulting actions. In
order to provide a context for the primary research question, the following objectives will
first be addressed:
1. Identify how natural resource planners view the situation in which they
operate,
2. Understand the relationship between perceptions of settings and the
planner's selection of planning models and,
3. Understand how various planning models are associated with the
planner's worldviews.

10

CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Overview
This chapter draws on concepts of previous research firom a number of areas
concerning planning processes, particularly in urban and natural resource settings. This
review of the literature provides a conceptual background for the development of the
specific research question and guides the data collection and analysis.
While many specialists in planning theory have written about planning practice,
the literature reveals important gaps in how planners perceive planning settings, the
appropriateness of various methods of planning, their preferences for implementing
different models of planning and how they view the role of public participation in
plarming.
Thus, I discuss the literature relating to changing paradigms toward natural
resource planning. I then describe the various levels of perceiving natural resource
problems. Next, I review literature regarding the organizational structure and culture in
which planners operate, focusing on such factors as openness to participation, the reward
and incentive structure, procedural obligations and the role of science. I then discuss
concepts associated with problem definition, goal agreement and casual relationships as
they pertain to natural resource issues. Finally, I propose seven working propositions to
investigate the planner's perceptions of the environment in which they operate and the
resulting actions. Recognizing that numerous factors exist that influence or directly
affect a planner's choice of a planning model including a planner's past experiences, I
focus on three broad subject areas prevalent in the literature that include the planner's
level of perception of the problem, the structure and culture of natural resource plaiming
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organizations and the way that problems are defined. A graphical representation of the
conceptual framework that governs this research is illustrated in Figure 1 (following
page).

Figure 1. Factors that affect a planner's choice of planning models.
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Changing Paradigms of Natural Resource Planning
In order to understand the current trends regarding new paradigms of planning, it
is first important to understand the connotations of the word "paradigm." Babbie
(1998:51) explains that paradigms simply "...provide ways of looking at life" while
Lincoln (1985:29) describes a paradigm as a "normative worldview" that "...reflects our
most basic beliefs and assumptions about the human condition." Herrero (1998:5)
defines a paradigm as "...a conceptual framework for understanding events ...our
interpretations of the world, the questions we ask, the levels of significance we ascribe
and the levels of confidence we accept are all based on the paradigms we hold. The
interrelationship of people's differing values, attitudes and actions toward nature can be
defined as their paradigm regarding nature." Rittel and Webber (1973:166) relate the
term to plaiming and explain that "...people choose those explanations which are most
plausible to them ...[and thus] (T)he analyst's 'world view' is the strongest determining
factor in explaining a discrepancy and, therefore, in resolving a wicked problem."
Kuhn (1962) applied his paradigmatic theories to the natural sciences explaining
that a mature science is guided by a single paradigm. Yet, when "anomalies" come to be
seen as posing serious problems to the paradigm, a period of "pronounced professional
insecurity" sets in (Kuhn 1962:67-68), Chalmers (1982:95) elaborates on Kuhn's work
and explains that "...once a paradigm has been weakened and undermined to such an
extent that its proponents lose their confidence in it, the time is ripe for revolution."
Thus, when a critical mass of information accumulates that is contradictory to the
accepted paradigm, a "revolution" occurs and the established paradigm is rejected in
favor of a new paradigm. In the case of natural resource planning, this critical mass
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could be construed to be the aforementioned issues regarding the characteristics of goods
2ind services, public dissatisfaction, and the availability of new paradigms of planning.
Imperial (1999) notes that although ecosystem-based management is often
advocated as a basis for land-use policy, it is relatively new and still evolving. For some,
the tenets surrounding ecosystem-based management advance a stochastic, nonlinear,
dynamic system based on a decentralized, adaptive and flexible management regime
(Conner and Moote 1999). Others note that ecosystems are "ecosocial systems" and are
the product of the "...relationships between people and nature over millennia" and thus
natural resource planning must incorporate political debate, "...located within the
dialectic of defining values and defining the structure and function of ecosocial systems
and their components" (Sharmon 1991:90). Bengston (1994) describes a new
environmental paradigm stressing harmony with nature, skepticism toward scientific and
technological fixes and a strong emphasis on public involvement in decision-making.
The Ecological Society of America recognizes that human effects on ecosystems are
ubiquitous and complex and that "...identifying and engaging stakeholders in the
development of management plans is a key ecosystem management strategy"
(Christensen 1996:670). However, Cortner and Moote (1999:51) explain that a new
worldview has not yet usurped the current natural resource planning paradigm stating,
"...while substantial information has been accumulated regarding ecological processes
and the political dysfunction of the traditional paradigm, the values, theories,
methodologies, and tools of the old paradigm have not yet been discarded." While
members of the scientific, academic and public may support the tenets of irmovati ve
ecosystem-based management strategies based on the dynamics between the social and
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biophysical environments, it is the contemporary political, legal and procedural
constructs that all work to impede the "revolution" from taking place. Corresponding!).
Cortner and Moote (1999:139) caution that ecosystem-based management may simph
employ "...tinkering with laws and policies" explaining, "American society, however,
may choose to define ecosystem management as an incremental addition to the concept
of multiple-use-sustained-yield, adopting what we have called a 'sustain-all-uses'
approach to ecosystem management." An ecosystem-based management approach that
continues to utilize the traditional technologically oriented, synoptic approach to land
management is simply the same wicked problem analyzed at a larger spatial and temporal
scale.

Levels of Perception
Given that paradigms toward natural resource planning are changing and
becoming more widely accepted, the likely causes, explanations and remedies of many
problems facing natural resource planners would then seem to lie not in the operational
intricacies of planning methods but rather in questioning the institutional and systemic
structures in which natural resource planning takes place. Caldwell (1990) purports that
there exist three levels of perceptions of environmental problems:
1. "Incidental perceptions" in which problems are addressed through
ad hoc corrections such as clean-up campaigns and are essentially
cosmetic,
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2. "Operational perceptions" in which problems are addresses through
corrective laws and regulations (with most government policy
administered and developed at this level) and,
3. "Systemic perceptions" in which problems are addressed through
changes in the redesign of institutions and development of
alternative methods of resolution.
Systemic issues relate to those that involve the values, goals and assumptions of a
society and according to Caldwell (1990) can only be corrected through extensive
restructuring and reform within the culture. Environmental degradation results from the
inherent dysfunctional design of social systems that rely on technology, economics and
efficiency. Paradigmatic change is necessary and according to Caldwell (1990:73, 76),
"...the remedy is sought in progressive adaptation and irmovation in institutional
arrangements" and takes place as "...prevailing understandings regarding events and
relationships fail to provide satisfactory explanations."
Addressing complex, value-laden problems with "incidental" or "operational"
problem-solving techniques often does not solve a problem and more importantly, can be
counter-productive in that problems become increasingly exacerbated and complex.
Thus, problems arise from the "solutions" to past problems or as Rittel and Webber
(1973:165) purport, "(E)very wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of
another problem."
When addressing problems of a "systemic" nature, only solutions that incorporate
methods of restructuring and reforming the basic social, political and economic
arrangements are relevant (Caldwell 1990). Consequently, scientific and technical
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knowledge will only briefly mitigate or conceal the fimdamental antecedents of problems
but will never truly "fix" them. Situations in which stakeholders hold different levels of
perceptions toward natural resource issues will inherently lead to a dysfunctional
planning process.
The most pragmatic approach then is sought in adaptation and innovation that
occurs within the institutional arrangements that exist. Addressing the difficult issues
surrounding natural resource planning, including planning for uncertainty and the dual
goals of use and preservation will ultimately, according to Cortner and Moote (1999:70),
"...require major revisions of social beliefs, values, norm and governance practices
...[and] revolutionary changes in the basic philosophical values of American society."
Others articulate this theme positing what is needed is a new rationality based on
ecological principles that incorporates ecology into natural resource decisions (Dryzek
1987), a more holistic "social ecology" based on mutualism (Bookchin 1991), a
devolution of power and reinvented politic based on "the art of the possible" (Kemmis
1990:109) or on bioregionalism, an "organic phenomenon" in which the constraints of the
landscape including hydrology, soil, vegetation and other biophysical forces dictate
administrative jurisdiction, land policy and use (Aberiy 1999). Caldwell (1990:66) points
out however that "...institutional change seldom precedes social reorientation, and then is
usually as an incident of war or top-down revolutions."

Organizational Structure and Culture
This section begins with a brief description of the historical influences of
contemporary natural resource planning and compares and contrasts synoptic and
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transactive models of plarming. Five issues related to the structure and culture of natural
resource planning organizations are described and discussed.
Land management planning in the United States grew largely from the
Progressive Era policies of the early twentieth century based on technocentric
utilitarianism (i.e. greatest good for the greatest number) in which science and efficiency
took precedence over values (Klyza 1996). The "myth of the omnipotent forester"
proliferated throughout the century as documented by Behan (1966;398) who quotes a
forestry professor proclaiming to his class, "(W)e must have enough guts to stand up and
tell the public how their land should be managed. As professional foresters, we know
what's best for the land."
Wilkinson (1992:17) describes the public land management policies that still
dominate natural resource planning today as the "Lords of Yesterday" that "...arose under
wholly different social and economic conditions but ...remain in effect due to inertia,
powerful lobbying forces, and lack of public awareness." These policies include a
mining law that has remained essentially the same since 1872. below cost and often
environmentally damaging grazing and timber harvesting policies, reclamation acts that
subsidize water development through poorly conceived dams and reservoirs and the
Doctrine of Prior Appropriations, a "first-come, first-served" water right, providing for
and encouraging profligate use of water.
Federal agencies involved in land management were originally allowed discretion
as to the delegation of mandates by congressional authority. The Progressives sought to
instill a political system that utilized scientific management guided by experts to serve
the public interest. Public perception of the abundance of natural capital and faith in
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technology negated radical reform throughout much of the early twentieth centurv' (Hirt
1994). After the Second World War and in response to a variety of social forces, the
discretion of federal land managing agencies was tempered by a host of legislation that
required improved information sharing, greater public involvement and consideration of a
broader range of values and consequences. Land planning and management statues, such
as the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, the National Enviroiunental Policy Act of
1969, the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, National Forest Management Act of
1976 and the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act of 1976 were responsive to the
perceived deficiencies of the Progressive Era planning models that worked "in a vacuum"
and tended to isolate the public from decision-makers. While these statutes appeared on
the surface to better coordinate social and biophysical relationships, the mandates
contained great vagaries as to the "how's" and instead focused on stipulations that agency
decision-making would continue to be both professional and objective to avoid
appearance of bias and would continue to "...rely upon professionals to set policy based
upon a congressional goal and an examination of the facts" (Poisner 1996:76). Thus, the
Progressive Era policies continue today as viewed by a faith in science and the reluctance
of planners to relinquish control and involve the public in a substantive and meaningful
way.
The process of synoptic planning incorporates this ideal by way of a four step
process that includes 1) specification of a goal, 2) identification of all possible methods
of obtaining the goal, 3) the evaluation of the effectiveness of methods to obtain the goal
and 4) the selection of the alternative with the greatest progress toward the goal. Often,
these elements are negotiated by "...using conceptual or mathematical models relating

20

ends (objectives) to means (resources and constraints) [5/c], with heavy reliance on
numbers and quantitative analysis" (Hudson 1979:389). Advocates of synopticism prefer
to divorce decision-making from politics and allow public participation so long as it
conforms to a scientific model (i.e. objective information exchange) and thus the synoptic
decision-making process becomes one of technical analysis and not group struggle
(Poisner 1996).
In comparison, a transactive approach to planning is one that is characterized by
dialogue, mutual learning and societal guidance with an emphasis on "...decentralized
plarming institutions that help people take increasing control over the social processes
that govern their welfare" (Hudson 1979:389). A transactive approach views the public
as integral and able to contribute experiential knowledge and therefore the approach
brings more information than if only "expert" knowledge was used. Friedmann
(1993 484) explains that this approach requires time and flexibility so that "...both
planners and citizens have the capacity to listen sympathetically and share the
responsibility for problem definition and solution" and thus becomes a method that
"...taps into people's capacity for proactive practice and, where it is successful, may help
to create a sense of collective solidarity." Members of the public are viewed as essential
and according to McCool and others (1986), in certain circumstances, have the ability to
act rationally within the context of the situation.
Social learning, as outlined by Stankey and others (1999) complements the
transactive planning process and contains numerous characteristics including a
recognition of the pluralism in values and interests and legitimacy of many forms of
knowledge, the promotion of active engagement and learning by doing and allowing for
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decision-making authority througli consensus-building. Table 1 illustrates various
qualities of synoptic and transactive planning.
Table 1. Qualities of synoptic and transactive planning.
SYNOPTIC ^
TRANSACTIVE *
Allows for formal public hearings with
allotted time limits
Stresses top-down dissemination of
information
Stresses apolitical orientation

Promotes avenues for two-way dialogue
Strives for mutual learning

Recognizes the pluralism in values and
interests
Puts faith in "best available science"
Recognizes the legitimacy of many forms
of knowledge
Relies primarily on numbers and
Uses science that informs rather than
quantitative analysis
dictates discussion
Allows for periodic engagement
Promotes active engagement and learning
by doing
Mandates decision-making through one
Allows decision-making through consensusentity
building
Allows for monitoring if convenient
Recognizes that ongoing monitoring is
essential to the learning process
Compartmentalizes problems and solutions Links people, places and process
1. Based on Hudson 1979; Poisner 1996; Cortner and Moote 1999
2. Based on Friedmann 1973, 1993; Stankey and others 1999
The transactive planning process is one that strives to build consensus among
interested parties made up of, "...composites of the unalike; their strength (as well as their
volatility) [5/c] lies in their diversity" (Snow 1996a:41) and posits "face-to-face
democracy" based on a Jeffersonian ideology of civic responsibility (Kemmis 1990). It is
a process that allows for differences in values and forms of knowledge and recognizes
that science is merely one tool in the planning process. Transactive plaiming is a
dynamic process and thus accommodates changing scenarios with new information and
new perspectives. Perhaps most importantly, the transactive model promotes a planning
environment where deliberation can take place and flourish and where learning is not just
a passive by-product but also a lofty goal.

Transactive planning and social learning can take place in many settings. Most
recently, processes incorporating the characteristics of transactive planning and social
learning have been recognized and sanctioned as legitimate and legal techniques,
particularly in many of the collaborative watershed-based approaches used in the western
United States (Cesteros 1999). Innes and Booher (1999:414-415) observed various
collaborative processes and report that participants in every process, "...established new
or stronger personal and professional relationships and built up trust, which allowed
genuine communication and joint problem-solving. With this social capital they felt less
hostile to others' view, were more likely to share knowledge, and were likely to negotiate
other potentially conflicting issues. In most cases, stakeholders also built shared
intellectual capital, including mutual understanding of each others' interests, shared
definitions of the problem, and agreement on data." This resulting social capital, defined
by Putnam (1995a, 1995b:67) as a community's ability to promote mutual trust and
reciprocity, and exhibit a collective identity and shared sense of future with "...features of
social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination
and cooperation for mutual benefit," could therefore be construed to be one of the most
important intangible outcomes of a planning process.
Frequently, contemporary natural resource planning processes are reactive and
crisis-oriented, and according to Yaffe (1994:185), "...based on information that is often
inadequate. Agencies are not unbiased sources of technical advice, interest groups act
adversarially and strategically in ways that conceal accurate information, and elected
officials focus on short-term survival in ways that are often counter-productive to the
broader public and future public's interest." Wildavsky (1973:128) defines plarming as

the attempt to control the consequences of our actions and claims that "...planning fails
everywhere it has been tried" because planning often dismisses the importance of
controlling the ftiture in which setting goals and achieving them are part of the same
series of actions. Further, Wildavsky (1973:129) summarizes the potential conflict in
stakeholder perception of planning outcomes by noting "(P)lanned decisions often have
unplanned consequences." Thus, an ideal decision-making process promotes creative
solutions that considers ftiture generations and the needs of nonhuman lifeforms, provides
opportunities and incentives for various interests to participate fully in, recognizes and
embraces these "implaimed consequences" and ultimately produces decisions that are
effective at solving problems.
Procedural Obligations
Currently, state and federal land managing agencies are constrained by procedural
obligations relating to natural resource planning and management. A regulatory agency
may be couched within or completely separate fi-om another agency. The obligations of a
regulatory agency may, in certain instances, be in competition with another agency's
mandate. For instance, an endangered species restoration plan that is under the direction
of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service may dictate policy on National Forest land even
though the mandate to manage the National Forest land (i.e. multiple use) is antithetical
to the restoration plan. These situations have caused considerable controversy as
exemplified by the northern spotted owl debate in the Pacific Northwest and the resuhing
National Forest Summit involving President Clinton, Vice-President Gore, three cabinet
members and the interagency Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (Yaffee
1994). In addition, federal agencies with regulatory authority such as the Environmental

24

Protection Agency and National Marine Fisheries Service can override other federal or
state land management directives to implement plans or protocols.
Land managers must follow statutes dictating natural resource planning procedure
such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969- This statute applies not
only to the four federal land management agencies (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. U.S.
Forest Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management) but also to other
federal agencies including the Departments of Defense, Energy and Transportation.
Moreover, numerous states have adopted legislation based on NEPA. The premise of
NEPA dictates that actions be evaluated in terms of their potential impact on the natural
and human environment. An agency conducts a site evaluation, called an Environmental
Assessment (EA) and if a finding of significant impact results, a detailed draft
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) must follow. This procedure requires that
proposed actions be documented incorporating various alternatives and that evaluations
of each alternative be based on the effects of implementation on the biophysical and
human environment. The public must be notified of these proposed actions and public
meetings and formal comment periods become a standard component of the process. The
agency must evaluate and respond to the comments in its final EIS. Loomis (1993)
explains that in many public land management agencies, decision techniques are based on
five criteria (biological, economic, distributional, social/cultural, and administrative)
using techniques such as a matrix approach to integrating the five criteria, a mathematical
optimization technique, or a screening approach to "filter" out the alternatives that do not
meet the minimum requirements of the criteria. Once the agency feels that issues have
been addressed regarding the optimal choice of alternatives, a supervising official in the

agency implements the preferred alternative through the signing of a "Record of
Decision" to document the decision. The statute has enabled the public to have access to
information, scrutinize agency actions and follow through with appeals and litigation.
Revolutionary in 1970 when it was signed into law, NEPA states "(T)he Congress
recognizes that ...each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and
enhancement of the envirormient" (42 USC § 4331, 1994 ed.) and mandates an
"...interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social
sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and decisiormiaking" (42 USC §
4332, 1994 ed.). Loomis (1993:46) notes that this interdisciplinary mandate
"...represented an important step in infusing new approaches to decision-making into
many federal agencies dominated by one discipline (e.g. forests in the Forest Service)
[sic]."
However, Webster (1997) equates the composition and nature of the current NEPA
process with the rigidity of a military decision-making process where needs are
identified, alternatives are established, advantages and disadvantages are weighed and a
final decision is made and implemented. The major difference is the participation of the
public and thus with this "rational" approach, "...the only viable opportunities to increase
efficiency lie in the performance of the steps involved" (Webster 1997:217). Webster
(1997:217) further explains that the deficiencies of NEPA include:
1. NEPA analysis starts late in that planning for a project "...is often
already well underway before the NEPA process is initiated,"
2. Time frames become inflexible in that "...optimistic timelines often
take precedence over the quality of the analysis,"
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3. Analysis and data requirements are complex "...in order to address
all the required and necessary disciplines,"
4. New and necessary concepts in environmental analysis are evolving
and include landscape ecology and biodiversity issues and may not
be easily incorporated in the NEPA process,
5. Data to drive the analyses are difficult to obtain and,
6. The notion of "significant impact" is "...based on context and
intensity, and within each technical discipline, different criteria can
apply."
A more recent critique of the NEPA found that "...over the past three decades
NEPA implementation has focused almost exclusively on the procedural requirements
...[and] often fails to effectively incorporate public opinion and adequately address
critical environmental protection issues" (Bergman and Kemmis 2000:3).
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972 is a statute created to
increase public access to the workings of federal agencies by allowing greater
participation through advisory committees. However, the statute has actually become a
barrier to progressive management due to several flaws including the numerous
requirements necessary to charter and maintain a committee, the ambiguities relating to
the terms that the committees be "established" or "utilized" by the federal government
and that the committees be "fairly balanced" (Norris-York 1996). Cortner and Moote
(1999) note that collaborative groups often do not conform to FACA's requirements
because they may not be fairly balanced in terms of points of view and may not be open
to public observation. Recent case law pertaining to FACA indicates that agencies are
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reluctant to engage the public in non-traditional public involvement phases of NEPA for
fear of litigation (Solomon and others 1997). Further, Schlager and Freimund (1997:59)
found that resource professionals, including those employed at the USFS and BLM.
ranked FACA as the second most serious obstacle to ecosystem-based management
stating the greatest concern was "...the fear of violating FACA ...[since many were]
unclear about what types of public contact were and were not allowed under FACA."
It is evident that many federal agencies involved in public land management have
come to view procedural obligations as hurdles to overcome rather than strategic
opportunities to improve public participation and relations. According to Wik and others
(2000), agencies have been reluctant to experiment with new processes for collaboration
and analysis because of the perceived risk of litigation. The fear of litigation has caused
agencies to work with legal advisors who act as arbiters involved in risk assessment of
legal parameters and thus, "...there has been a general agency preference for creating
legally acceptable documents rather than engaging in experimental collaborative efforts,
larger scale analysis, or proactive resolution of concerns" (Wik and others 2000:13-14).
The mechanization of an inherently dynamic political process often leads to formal
meetings, one-way dissemination of information and the disjointed execution of
mandated steps to attain an end. Legislation that was supposed to provide for greater
public involvement and information sharing has actually been responsible for greater
alienation, apathy and bureaucracy.
In response to the multiple levels of dissatisfaction with the USFS planning
process, the Committee of Scientists, a 13-member body convened by the Secretary of
Agriculture in 1997, released a report on the USFS planning process and
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recommendations for improvements (Johnson and others 1999). The tasks of the
committee included providing technical advice on planning and suggesting a new
planning framework. The committee recommended that "...planning must provide
mechanisms for broad-based, vigorous, and on-going opportunities for open dialogue
...The participation of citizens should be encouraged from the beginning and be
maintained throughout the planning process, including roles in assessments, issueidentification, implementation, and monitoring" (Johnson and others 1999:10). While the
Committee of Scientists' report advocates collaboration and cooperatively developed
goals, "...recognizing, enhancing, and capitalizing upon the capacity of interested and
affected people to engage in stewardship activities" (36 CFR 219.12), committee member
Roger Sedjo (1999:13) explains the recommendations in the report "...are cautious and
limited ...[since] (W)ithout a basic reform ~ particularly reform of the budget process to
allow the budget and the plan to be in concert ~ proposed changes in the planning
process as recommended by the committee will do little to change or improve the
outcome of the planning process."
The numerous state and federal procedures and regulatory' mandates created to
expedite natural resource planning and improve public participation have in many
instances created obstacles to a deliberative and learning-oriented process. Planners are
now faced with balancing the plethora of regulatory statutes regarding public land
management and natural resource planning with the needs of accommodating an
increasingly dissatisfied and vocal public.
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Flexibility
The ability of a nattiral resource planning organization to be flexible involves the
degree to which creativity can be accommodated and promoted. This flexibility usually
involves the available time, fimding and personal resources of the organization. Often,
natural resource planning takes place in a large bureaucratic environment in which
efficiency and precision subordinate an ability to accommodate a flexible process focused
on social learning. Bureaucrats, according to Cortner and Moote (1999:62), must be
"...professional experts who are 'above politics' [but] they must, paradoxically, be
politically responsive."
Many natural resource organizations have become large, expert-driven
bureaucracies with positions that are highly specialized in order to maximize efficiency
while mandating stringent standards, reliability and precision. German sociologist Max
Weber (1864-1920) noted the dependency that drives a bureaucracy and observed,
"...bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modem mass democracy in contrast to
democratic self-government of small homogenous units ...More and more the material
fate of the masses depends on the steady and correct functioning of the increasingly
bureaucratic organization" (Gerth and Mills 1946:224, 229).
The Progressive Era conservation movement embraced a "gospel of efficiency"
whereby experts, using technological and scientific methods, decided matters regarding
the development and utilization of resources and consequently, "(T)he crux of the gospel
of efficiency lay in a rational and scientific method of making basic technological
decisions through a single, central authority" (Hays 1959:271). Contemporary natural
resource management agencies follow this model and have become increasingly remote
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from the pubhc because of the speciaUzed information and jargon they use (Schneider
and Ingham 1997).
Past research on the perceptions that natural resource plarmers have of the
institutional structtire in which they operate suggests a culture that is centralized,
authoritarian, process-oriented and reluctant to change (Lee 1993, Cortner and Moote
1999). This structure is exemplified by inflexibility as expressed by rigidity of timelines,
insufficient financial appropriations for thorough and dynamic planning situations and a
lack of personnel to accomplish innovative planning techniques. This structure has in
many cases fhistrated managers and the public alike. Despite the relatively rigid nature
of existing institutional structures, planners maintain a comparatively wide latitude in
selection of plarming processes and methodologies. Mandelbaum (1996:114) posits that
discretionary power of the individual plarmer is necessary and argues "...it is impossible
to imagine a stable or competent institutional order that does not adapt to variations in the
world by assigning some discretion to its participants ...[who would be therefore] able to
redirect public policy on the ground." Caldwell (1990:77) explains that the
administrative structures of most modem governments exhibit "...an ad hoc political
rationality" that is poorly adapted to the ecological circumstances and challenges of the
present world where public officials often become "...skilled at appearing to profess one
policy while in fact pursuing another." While planners often operate in an inflexible
environment, the practice of natural resource planning generally requires ample
adaptability and bears little resemblance to this rigid condition. This often contributes to
growing dissatisfaction by the public and leads to frustration by planners and may be

31

partly responsible for the variety of prescriptive legislative mandates that have been
introduced in the past.
Scientism
The role of science and technical information is increasingly challenged as the
dominant foundation for which natural resource decisions should be based. Caldwell
(1990:67) refers to "scientism" as the belief that science is inherently capable of solving
almost all human problems and argues, "...science is least developed and least reliable in
the very area in which it might best inform humans regarding their options and
limitations in social choices and governance - at the interface of the natural and social
sciences. As a consequence, science and technology have been put to the service of
purposes and policies for which science provides no adequate criteria for evaluation."
Yankelovich (1991:10) notes that "...in this Age of Information, American culture grossly
overvalues the importance of information as a form of knowledge and undervalues the
importance of cultivating good judgement. It assumes, falsely, that good information
automatically leads to good judgement." While science-based synoptic models of
planning may prove prudent in certain natural resource plarming circumstances, the
literature supports the presumption that political and value-based situations are not
conducive to this planning model. Science then is necessary, but not sufficient in valueladen situations since, according to Clark and Stankey (1994), these issues tend to be
fundamentally social so the solutions must embrace people.
The Role of the Public
In her seminal work regarding citizen participation, Amstein (1969:216)
establishes a hierarchy of citizen empowerment and control and addresses the need for

institutions to be responsive to the views, needs and aspirations of the citizenr>' since
valid participation in government is "the cornerstone of democracy." Natural resource
planning

has been slow to adequately accommodate these views, needs and aspirations.

Solomon and others (1997) maintain that agencies rely on a limited array of public
involvement techniques, yet early and frequent public involvement can reduce conflict
and build cooperative relationships based on resolving mutual concerns. The public
involvement process under NEPA promotes "...methods of one-way communication" and
thus the public often views an agency "...as non-responsive to their needs, and they must
resort to other effective means of expressing their ideas, positions, or issues, usually by
use of administrative appeal, litigation, or mediation processes" (Solomon and others
1997:269).
The public will only become and remain involved in a process when they sense
their interests are being heard and incorporated. Tipple and Wellman (1989:24) articulate
this theme stating, "...the basic premise is that citizens will support the government only
if they have voluntarily associated with it and feel it is generally responsive to their
interests." McLaughlin and Force (1985) surveyed USPS Forest Supervisors and staff
members regarding their roles as either "Leader, Partner or Follower" in the ten National
Forest Management Act (NFMA) planning steps. The results establish that USFS
planners see their roles primarily as "Leaders," less commonly as "Partners" and only
rarely as "Followers" implying an unwillingness to be open to public input or feedback.
Selin and others (1997) svirveyed USFS employees on their perceptions of the current and
future application of collaborative methods. The study revealed that barriers do exist
within the organization including the perception by employees that collaborative planning
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is not supported by line officers at all levels of the organization. Respondents indicated
that the greatest perceived barrier was that planning initiatives were constrained b>'
personal agendas.
Reward Structure
Institutions associated with natural resource planning have several incentives for
allowing the individual planner or management unit discretion for planning, but perhaps
most importantly, is the need to be responsive to public interests in order to avoid the
gridlock and contention that has plagued natural resource planning over the past several
decades. However, incentives or opportvinities must be made available to planners in
order for individual and collective experimentation and risk-taking to occur and flourish.
Kennedy and Quigley (1998) report on the reward structure within the USPS noting
respondents of their study believe the values that should be rewarded within their agency
include 1) professional competence, 2) care and concern for healthy ecosystems and 3)
care and concern for future generations, yet respondents believe the values actually
rewarded by their agency were 1) loyalty to the organization, 2) meeting targets, 3)
promoting a good USPS image and 4) following rules and regulations.
Senge and others (1994:462) describe a "risk-avoidance" strategy present in many
organizations in which the act of "non-inquiry" becomes an addictive loop of "shifting
the burden" and sweeping information under the rug in order to avoid "anxiety."
Consequently, the ability to solve problems relies on a strategy of inquiry, inventory and
audit while incorporating the time sufficiently necessary to promote a dialogic setting in
which collective thinking can occur. Senge and others (1994--139-140) describe
"systems-thinking" in which methods, tools and principles are oriented toward looking at
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the interrelatedness of forces and seeing them as part of a common process that allows
members of a team to "...suspend [their] preconceptions about which 'solution' fits the
slot, and instead try to explore, as an interfunctional group, the deeper sources of the
problem." It is access to this environment that promotes a systems-thinking approach and
allows for the exploration of the deeper sources of a problem. Furthermore, Senge and
others (1994:200) establish that managers must abandon the assumption that people are
motivated by money, recognition and fear or enticed by a "carrot and stick" or "doom and
gloom" scenario and therefore must clarify a larger vision and promote an environment
where "...people want to learn, do good work for its own sake, and be recognized as
people."

Problem Definition
Problem definition can profovmdly impact the problem-solving process and
quality of solutions. Bardwell (1991) explains that the most crucial single factor
governing problem-solving involves the definition of the problem and includes the
following three issues: 1) the problem definition will drive the assumptions that
undermine approaches to the problem; 2) the definition of a problem will ultimately
guide the strategies and actions taken to address the problem; 3) the exploration of
aspects of the problem will influence the quality of the solution. A planner's
understanding of the interrelationships between social and biophysical systems (including
landscape ecology and political systems) can greatly improve the planner's capacity to
recognize problems and initiate problem-solving strategies. Accordingly, in a natural
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resource planning situation, how a problem is defined can affect the choice of planning
model, the methods of execution and the resulting actions.
In addition to how a problem is defined, the lack of agreement on goals and the
degree of imderstanding of casual relationships can influence the plarming process.
Indeed, as Rittel and Webber (1973:157) assert, "...goal-finding is one of the central
functions of planning." Thompson and Tuden (1987) present a matrix of decision
making strategies based on beliefs about causation and preferences about possible
outcomes or goals (see Table 2).
Table 2. Matrix of planning situations.
GOALS
Agreement
Disagreement
Computation
(Bureaucracy)
Disagreement
Judgement
Source: adapted from Thompson and Tuden (1987)
CAUSE AND
EFFECT
RELATIONSHIPS

Agreement

Compromise
Inspiration

The matrix illustrates that when beliefs about causation are uncertain and
preferences about possible outcomes (goals) are competing, organizations must approach
decision-making with "inspiration" and employ planning techniques that are not based
upon synoptic planning models. Lee (1993) refers to this area of the matrix simply as
"conflict" and suggests either "settling" or "consensus-building" strategies, both of which
entail mutual learning.
Transactive planning and the ensuing social learning is implied as an effective
process when confronting "wicked" problems or circumstances requiring "inspiration"
(Friedmann 1973, Stokes 1982, McCool and others 1986, Thompson and Tuden 1987,
McCool and Burchfield 1999; Stankey and others 1999). Friedmaim (1973:171) explains
that a transactive approach "...changes knowledge into action through an unbroken
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sequence of interpersonal relations" and stresses the dynamics of dialogue, mutual
learning and societal guidance. Further, Friedmann (1993 484) explains that this
interaction must start early and should "...draw potentially affected populations into the
planning

process from the very begirming when problems still need defining."

Much of the literature reveals that the problems surrounding natural resource
planning, and many contemporary environmental problems are not only complex and
multi-dimensional in nature, but solutions to them must be attacked at the most
fundamental level (i.e. a change in paradigm). Additionally, the dynamics regarding the
changing characteristics of goods and services demanded by the public, the political
nature of natural resource planning, the growing dissatisfaction by the public and the
institutional structure of land management agencies amalgamate to create an hostile
planning environment within which the planner operates.
Based on the preceding information and conceptual framework, this study
attempts to outline and examine planner's perceptions of the planning environment and
choices of planning models. While critiques of highly contentious, often volatile and
politically-charged public land management controversies abound, there exists a paucity
of analysis regarding natural resource planning paradigms of individual planners, their
choice of planning models and the consequences that result. Recognizing the
complexities and challenges facing contemporary natural resource planners while they
accommodate the social needs and values of a growing population, there exists an
urgency to understand and describe prescriptive measures to improve plarming and
enhance biological health and social capital in the twenty-first century. It is at these
levels that I approach the research objectives and working propositions.
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Working Propositions
In a sense, the adoption of a new planning paradigm is similar to the adoption of a
new technology, a process well documented in the literature examining diffusion of
innovations (Rogers 1995). Perceptions of the planning environment are influenced by a
number of key variables including the organizational structure that the planner operates
in, the presence of institutional incentives for experimentation, the problem definition,
and the perception of the problem. In order for planners to embrace new paradigms, they
must be both willing to accept their role in new planning scenarios and understand the
dynamics of various planning models.
Typically, the choice of a planning model is influenced by a multitude of factors
including past experience, problem definition, levels of perception and the organizational
and environmental factors in which the planner works and lives in. Since imderstanding
the perceptions that planners have toward the planning enviroimient and recognizing that
these perceptions are intricately linked to their choices of planning models, the following
seven working propositions will be applied.
Procedures that mandate specific actions have become the rule in contemporary
natural resource planning situations, yet often it is the regulatory requirements imposed
from an institution that differ from and may even directly conflict with the mandate of the
institution in which the planner operates. Planners are often concerned with the legal
repercussions of not following procedural requirements and thus may be more concerned
with procedural obligations than finding new processes for collaboration and analysis.
When the regulatory requirements impede the structure and ftinction of the planning
domain, a planner may feel restricted in the choices available for possible action and
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confined to a model that may be not only inappropriate but also covmter-productive.
therefore:
WP 1: "A planner who perceives the planning environment as impeded by
procedural obligations is more likely to prefer models of planning other
than synoptic."
An organization may rigidly adhere to a technocentric or rational science-based
approach to nattiral resource planning. Experiential knowledge may be as legitimate or in
some cases, more pertinent than technical forms of knowledge. Institutional structures
may not advocate for or accept the validity of forms of knowledge that do not adhere to a
particular paradigmatic orientation. Yet, a plarming process that welcomes experiential
knowledge may promote a more inclusive atmosphere that encourages experimentation
and dynamism, therefore:
WP 2: "A planner who perceives scientism as inadequate is more likely to
prefer models of planning other than synoptic."
An institution or an individual planner may want to try innovative methods with
regard to natural resource planning situations, but the institutional structure may restrict
the freedom to do so. Restrictions including time, budgets and persormel resources may
supersede the requirements of a particular planning model. The institution may enlist
individuals that are open to new plarming methods, but these plarmers are held to specific
temporal or spatial planning restrictions, therefore:
WP 3: "A planner who perceives the planning environment as inflexible is
more likely to prefer models of planning other than synoptic."
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A planner may not be motivated to use innovative planning models simpl>'
because their input or innovation will not be rewarded. An organization may actually
institute mechanisms that promote "risk-avoidance" strategies instead of ones that
promote robust analysis of complex problems. The "risk-avoidance" strategy can lead the
individual to feeling iminspired and demoralized as a result. With little incentive to apply
an innovative planning model, a plaimer may simply concede to the organization and
reluctantly and apathetically implement a conventional model that the planner feels is
inappropriate. The type of incentive or recognition has implications that can severely
impact an individual's motives toward experimentation and a more collective "systemsthinking" approach, therefore:
WP 4: "A plaimer who perceives the plarming environment as one that
rewards iimovation is more likely to prefer models of plaiming other than
synoptic."
Public participation tends to be a hallmark characteristic of plarming in settings
where there is debate over goals. However, the role of the public in many natural
resource plarming settings is hindered and often promotes adversity and the potential for
litigation. It is recognized that plarming processes can be more effective when the public
is contributing as much knowledge as the planners, when planning models emphasize
learning, and when the connections between knowledge and action become more explicit,
therefore:
WP 5: "A plaimer who feels that public participation should be
encouraged is more likely to prefer models of planning other than
synoptic."
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The manner in which problems are defined greatly affects the methods that are
employed to solve the problem. The problem definition will in many cases drive the
assumptions that lead to problem-solving techniques. The literature reveals that in
circumstances where goals are competing and causal relationships are poorly understood,
organizations are most effective when using an approach that stresses "inspiration," a
method not favored in synoptic models. Effective problem solving in which the
identification of and agreement on goals and questions about causal relationships are
given precedence can improve the methods used to solve the problem, therefore:
WP 6: "A planner who recognizes that goals are contested is more likely
to prefer models of planning other than synoptic."
Planners may choose to address complex value-laden problems with standardized,
"one-size-fits-all" problem-solving techniques when the source of and solution to the
problem is more systemic and fundamental in nature. In these cases, a substantially
different approach should be taken as to the plarming model adopted. The planner must
first recognize that the problem lies at this systemic level before a new paradigmatic
approach is attempted, therefore:
WP 7: "A planner who perceives problems as existing on a svstemic level
is more likely to prefer models of planning other than synoptic."
The aforementioned working propositions and conceptual fi-amework derived
from literature relating to urban and natural resource planning, organizational structure
and culture, problem definition and the identification of and agreement on goals and
causal relationships combined with interviews with planners provides the basis of
analysis for this research. Since, as Patterson and Williams (in review) proclaim, the use
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of working propositions is confined to defending a position, confirming prejudgments or
"...limited to confirmation or disconfirmation of prior hypotheses," the testing of the
working propositions is supplemented with a more interpretivist approach toward
"...developing an understanding of an issue rather than testing pre-existing propositions."
These methods are described in greater detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
Description of Study Areas
This research details the perceptions of planning from a purposeful sample of
twenty-eight individuals involved in the following four natural resources planning
processes:
1. Bitterroot Ecosystem Grizzly Bear Recovery Process,
2. Glacier National Park General Management Plan,
3. Upper Clark Fork River Basin Management Plan,
4- Blackfoot River Recreation Management Plan.
Processes 2 and 3 have recently concluded and processes 1 and 4 are ongoing.
While each of these processes share similar general characteristics, the study areas have
taken place at various spatial and temporal scales in the northern Rocky Mountains and
contain elements that make them unique and distinct. Table 3 (following page) presents a
summary of the general characteristics of the study areas and serves as an aid to define
and distinguish the particular study areas and plarming processes.

Table 3. Matrix of planning process and general characteristics.
Impetus
for
Meeting

Mandate
for
Product

Decision
making
Authority

Potential
for
Unilateral
Action

Funding

Meetings

Time

Geographic
Area

Biophysical
Conditions

Focus
of Plan

Grizzly

-25,000
sq. mi.

Sub-alpine to
Lower Montane
Forests

Grizzly
Bear
Recovery

Mandated^

Yes

Individualistic

High

Imposed

Selective
and
Intermittent

Limited

Glacier

-1,500
sq. mi.

Sub-alpine to
Lower Montane
Forests

General
Mgmt.
Plan

Mandated^

Yes

Individualistic

High

Imposed

Selective
and
Intermittent

Limited

-160 stream
mi.'

Riparian
Corridor

Water
Rights &
Instream
Flows

Voluntary"*

Yes

Collective

Low

Selfinitiated

Open and
Regular

Limited

132
stream mi.

Riparian
Corridor

Recreation

Mandated'

Yes

Collective

Low

Imposed

Open and
Regular

Limited

Clark
Fork
Blackfoot

1. While the Upper Clark Fork River (Milltown Dam to headwaters above Butte, MT) is -160 stream miles, the basin includes over
4,400 perennial stream miles (Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee 1994).
2. As outlined in the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 USC § 1531-1544, 1994 ed.).
3. As outlined in the U.S. National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 (16 USC § la-7b, 1994 ed.).
4. Initiated by stakeholders.
5. As outlined in House Bill 629, 1999 Montana Legislature.
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The table provides only a general overview and is not meant to be a
comprehensive explanation of all of the characteristics present. While the general
characteristics are detailed in the following pages of this chapter, several characteristics
of Table 3 should be defined. The column in Table 3 titled "Potential for Unilateral
Action" relates to the ability of one party (be it government or non government) to
influence or disrupt (by litigious means or otherwise) the planning process. The
"Meetings" column of Table 3 defines a meeting process as "Selective and Intermittent,"
utilizing scoping, public meetings or hearings that occur occasionally and in which the
organizing entity performs in a passive capacity to gather interested parties compared to
meetings that are open and occur on a regular basis in which the organizing entity
actively promotes engagement with and between stakeholders.
The four study areas can be broadly characterized by spatial qualities and
orientation of policy. The Bitterroot Ecosystem Gri/zly Bear Recovery Process is based
on a large geographic area (over 25,000 square miles) and multiple vegetative zones
(including sub-alpine forests and lower montane forests) that make up several watersheds
and involve numerous communities (and their respective political systems including the
federal, state and municipal agencies and an Indian Reservation) surrounding the
recovery area. The decision-making authority lies with the Secretary of Interior after
preparing a "Record of Decision" to document the findings and determination. In
addition, the issue is policy-based and involves a "community of interest" that is national
in scale as opposed to a "community of place" that involves a more local constituency
that exhibits "...a shared identity, culture and social system ...[in which] (T)he connection
to or identification with a shared place is the predominant organizing force" (Cesteros
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1999:10). Similarly, the Glacier National Park General Management Plan is based on a
large geographic area (over 1,500 square miles) and multiple vegetative zones (including
sub-alpine forests and lower montane forests) that make up several watersheds and
involve the numerous communities and their respective political systems (including the
Blackfeet Indian Reservation) surrounding and influenced by the park. The decision
making authority lies with upper management within the National Park Service. In
addition, the plan involves a community of interest that is national (and likely
international considering World Heritage and Biosphere Reserve designation) in scale.
Furthermore, both of these plaiming processes are mandated and guided by national
legislative statutes that dictate particular outcomes. In contrast, the Upper Clark Fork
River Basin Management Plan and the Blackfoot River Recreation Management Plan are
based on the narrow riparian corridor of a single watershed and focus on a community of
place as there is little in the way of national interest, prerogative or interference. While
the authority to implement the plans for these processes is held by the Montana
Legislature, the decision-making authority for the crafting of the plans is based on the
consensus of the committee members who were self-appointed or who represented nearly
all stakeholder interests.
Planners in this study are defined as anyone involved in the preparation,
management and implementation of a planning process. Plaimers include not only state
or federal employees but also members of non-governmental organizations and the
general public who actively participated or were intimate with the specific planning
situation.
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The four study areas were chosen because of the unique qualities of the planning
processes. My rationale for choosing these four study areas is based on the following;
1. Planners working in these planning processes have experienced
difficulties due to the contentious nature of the plan and planning
process (i.e. have operated in "wicked" situations) and,
2. The processes represented different contexts and allowed for a range
of diverse planning environments from which to study, compare
and contrast.
Each of the study areas are described below in detail to provide an explicit and
accurate account of the context of each of the processes.

1. Bitterroot Ecosystem Grizzly Bear Recovery Process
The grizzly bear was listed as a threatened species in the lower 48 in 1975, the
same year that the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 was created. The ESA
provides "...a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation
of such endangered species and threatened species ...to use and the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to
the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer necessary
...[in which] the Secretary shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary and
advisable to provide for the conservation of such species"' (16 USC § 1531-1544, 1994
ed.). Most significantly, the ESA shifted responsibility for endangered plants and
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animals from the state to the federal level emphasizing the protection of habitat, even on
privately owned land.
The last verified bear sighting in the Bitterroot Ecosystem area occurred in 1932
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1997). (Note: the phrase "Bitterroot Ecosystem" is based
on the description provided by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (1997:1-4) that states
"(T)he core of the ecosystem contains the Selway-Bitterroot, Frank Church-River of No
Return Wilderness Areas.") The Bitterroot Ecosystem (BE), located in east-central Idaho
and southwestern Montana, was evaluated as a potential recovery site as early as 1982,
since the reintroduction of grizzly bears in this area it is thought, may provide a viable
migration corridor between the Yellowstone and Glacier-Bob Marshall ecosystems,
restore a native component of the BE, and add to the argument for delisting the grizzly
bear. In 1992, the area was endorsed by the Interagency Grizzly Bear Committee, a
group of "...high-level administrators that represent the federal and state agencies
involved in grizzly bear recovery" (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 2000:6-9) and
authorized the preparation of the Recovery Plan for the Bitterroot Ecosystem. A Citizen
Involvement Group (CIG) was organized by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS), the lead agency in recovery, "...to help guide the development of the Bitterroot
Ecosystem Grizzly Bear Recovery Plan Chapter," a chapter in the more comprehensive
Grizzly Bear Recovery Plan (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 2000: 6-22). The CIG was
formed through invitations that were published in newspapers and sent to people on
mailing lists from several local national forests. The final draft BE Recovery Plan called
for an EIS to evaluate a full range of recovery alternatives. Several public meetings were
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held in 1993 to obtain comments and open houses took place in 1994 in six communities
near the recovery area to provide information on this draft of the BE Recovery Plan.
Public scoping sessions for the Draft EIS (DEIS) began in July, 1995 and took
place in seven commimities near the recovery area. Written comments on issues and
alternatives were received from more than 3,300 individuals, organizations and
government agencies. Results of the public scoping process were summarized and 46
issues were identified (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1995). The process of
summarizing the scoping sessions was conducted by a content analysis team that
consisted of nine members of the USFWS and the USFS and took a total of 14 days. The
process utilized a coding system in which each individual was given a unique
identification number that was then entered into a computer database for "...easier sorting
and retrieval ...[and] provides a traceable, visible system for displaying public comments
without interjecting interpretation or judgement" (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1995;2).
The USFWS (1995:2) ftirther claims that "(A)ll respondents' values, perceptions and
opinions were recorded, including those based on misinformation ...[in which] a coder
first read the entire response to gain an overall understanding of the respondents'
viewpoint, then re-read the response, highlighting and coding substantive comments."
In July 1997, the DEIS on grizzly bear recovery in the BE was completed and
released for public comment. The public comment process included seven public
hearings that were held in communities near the recovery area. Fear for human health
and safety were the issues raised most often during the public comment period (U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service 1998). Issues also arose regarding road closures, the continuation of
resource extraction, the effect of reintroduction on source populations, the suitability of
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the BE habitat and the legitimacy of past research that concluded the grizzly bear had
been extirpated from the BE. Consequently, the USFWS received over 24,000 comments
on the four proposed alternatives in the DEIS that detailed various approaches of grizzly
bear recovery. The USFWS (1998) asserts that these public involvement efforts were
"...intended to gather information and ideas from the public on proposed actions and
alternatives to the proposed action to provide a clear basis for choice among options b\
the decisionmaker and the public. An analysis of public comments will help the
decisionmaker make better decisions, ...[by] indicating trends of public opinion."
Prior to the release of the DEIS in 1993, individuals representing the National
Wildlife Federation and the Defenders of Wildlife approached members of the
Intermountain Forest Industry Association and the Resource Organization on Timber
Supply (or ROOTS, which incidentally has stuck to identify the whole group),
representing timber industry workers, to work out methods that could ameliorate the
potential for polarization and associated delays that had plagued the recent wolf
reintroduction in the Yellowstone ecosystem. Their proposal was incorporated into the
DEIS as the Preferred Alternative, and called for a Citizen Management Committee
(CMC) to manage grizzly bear reintroduction. This preferred alternative also called for
the establishment of a 'nonessential experimental population' of grizzly bears in the BE
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1997). This nonessential experimental population
categorization infers that certain problem bears "...whose loss would not likely reduce the
survival of the species in the wild" would be subject to euthanasia (U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service 1997). The CMC would possess "...authorized management implementation
responsibility" for the project; moreover, the committee would have critical responsibility
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"...for recommending changes in land use standards and guidelines as necessary- for
grizzly bear management" (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1997). The proposed plan
declared that the CMC "...is to consist of a cross-section of interests reflecting a balance
of viewpoints, be selected for their diversity of knowledge and experience in natural
resource issues, and for their commitment to collaborative decision-making ...[and will
be] comprised of local citizens and agency representatives from federal and state agencies
and the Nez Perce Tribe" (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1997). There would be 15
members; 12 of whom would be appointed by the Governors of Idaho and Montana. The
core area of the recovery zone under this alternative is 5,785 square miles while the
experimental population area encompasses a total of 25,140 square miles. The USFWS
(2000:2-24) conclusively determined that this area is "...of sufficient size to allow for
grizzly bear recovery."
A second alternative in the DEIS dealing with grizzly bear reintroduction was
termed the "Conservation Biology Alternative" (Bader and Bechtold 1996) and called for
a committee of scientists to manage grizzly reintroduction while retaining full protection
for bears under the ESA, and providing for a substantially greater expanse of protected
habitat. The other alternatives in the DEIS called for no bears or no action.
The Final EIS (FEIS) was released March 10, 2000 with a 30-day comment
period ending April 24, 2000 (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 2000). The preferred
alternative in the FEIS remained similar to the preferred alternative in the DEIS except
for several points. First, the preferred alternative in the FEIS includes a more detailed
description of how bears will be handled if they enter the "exclusion areas," where human
health and safety are an issue. There is an increased emphasis on the outreach
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information and education program that would accompany the recovery. In addition, the
structure and function of the CMC is clarified and changed with additions on how the
CMC would be selected, the need for greater scientific expertise on the CMC and the
need for further insulation of the CMC from political influences. Lastly, the preferred
alternative of the FEIS contains a clarification regarding how the recovery goal would be
calculated and on the use of livestock guard dogs. While the "Record of Decision" is not
expected to be signed until the summer of 2000, federal officials predict that lawsuits or
injunctions will be filed by certain opposing groups that "...could take years to resolve"
(Grandstaff 2000:6).

2. Glacier National Park General Management Plan
Glacier National Park (GNP) is a large (over 1 million acres) protected area
located in northwestern Montana and at the apex of three large watershed divides. The
park was established in 1910 as a tribute to the glacial and geomorphological processes
that formed its mountainous terrain, is managed by the U.S. National Park Service and
contains the finest grouping of alpine glaciers in the conterminous United States
(National Park Service 1999). It is designated as both a Biosphere Reserve in 1976 and
World Heritage site in 1995 and together with Waterton National Park in Canada, has
been designated since 1935 as an International Peace Park. It receives approximately 2
million visits annually, mostly concentrated in the period June to September.
The U.S. National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 requires that "(G)eneral
management plans for the preservation and use of each unit of the National Park System
...shall be prepared and revised in a timely manner ...[and] shall include, but not be
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limited to: (1) measures for the preservation of the area's resources: (2) indicators of
types and general intensities of development (including visitor circulation and
transportation patterns, systems and modes) [5/c] associated with public enjoyment and
use of the area, including general locations, timing of implication, and anticipated cost:
(3) identification of and implementation commitments for visitor carrying capacities for
all areas of the unit; and (4) indications of potential modifications to the external
boundaries of the unit, and the reasons therefor" (16 USC § la-7b, 1994 ed.). Planners
working in GNP were confronted with ntimerous issues including the management of
several designated threatened or endangered species (grizzly bear, gray wolf, bald eagle,
bull trout and peregrine falcon), regulations surroimding scenic air tours, winter use in the
park and the repair of the Going-to-the-Sun Road, a highway placed on the National
Register of Historic Places and used by over 80 percent of the visitors to GNP.
In March of 1995, Glacier National Park publicly announced that a new General
Management Plan (GMP) would be prepared to succeed its nearly twenty-year-old GMP.
A planning team was assembled and consisted of the Superintendent, Division Chiefs,
and park staff that volunteered or complied with a request to serve on the team. In
addition, technical experts from the National Park Service's Denver Service Center
served as advisors or participants on the team. The GMP process began with scoping
sessions held regionally in nine open house forums. In addition, consultation with local
Indian tribes and Waterton National Park were conducted. As a result of this public input
and two publicly released newsletters, 2,300 comments were received. The comments
generally favored "...limited growth in the park and even removing facilities to enhance
wilderness values" (National Park Service 1999:5). Incorporating these assumptions into
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the next newsletter, the park released Newsletter Three in July, 1996 detailing three
alternatives, which favored varying degrees of campground closure and restrictions on
the use and parking along the Going-to-the-Sun Road. The evaluation of alternatives in
Newsletter Three generated "...considerable media attention" (National Park Service
1999:6) and caused a great deal of contention among certain factions of the public who
felt their views had not been heard or incorporated. The park recognized the contention
and later noted "...the preliminary draft alternatives were not well received by the public
as evidenced by the written responses and testimony received at the public meetings"
(National Park Service 1998b:250).
Twelve public meeting were held and approximately 1,600 letters were received
regarding the alternatives in Newsletter Three. In response to the public reaction to the
newsletter, a publication titled "Synopsis of Public Comments on Newsletter Three" was
released in April 1997 and attempted to address public concern of the preliminary draft
alternatives. The park stated that "(T)he content analysis was one of the tools that the
planning team is using to understand how the public felt about the ideas contained in
Newsletter 3" (National Park Service 1997:1). The park noted that the general theme of
comments from the public favored no change at all explaining, "...one of the comments
heard frequently from the public was 'leave it like it is' and why fix something that isn't
broken?' For this reason, the planning team decided to present some of the issues facing
park managers ...and began working on defining ftiture management goals and
objectives" (National Park Service 1998b:251). Three additional newsletters were
released between the winter of 1996 and summer of 1997.
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The release of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement took place in the
summer of 1998, presimiably delayed from the actions that occurred after the release of
Newsletter Three. Regarding the combined GMP and DEIS, the park candidly
proclaimed, "(N)ot everyone will like our alternatives or will agree with our assessments,
but we have done our best to air the issues, develop alternative solutions, and select a
preferred alternative using the best information available" (National Park Service 1998a).
The GMP/DEIS stated, "(C)oiimients on this draft plan are encouraged and will be
carefully considered" (National Park Service 1998b).
A series of public open houses and public hearings were again held and by the
end of the comment period, over 2,700 written comments, including transcripts of the
testimony from the hearings and comments made at the open houses were received and
evaluated. Park plarmers reported that in order to evaluate public sentiment about the
GMP/DEIS, "(E)ach comment was numbered, and information from the letters was
recorded. This system helped NPS persormel analyze the comments and compose the
responses" (National Park Service 1999:8-9).
In the combined GMP and Final EIS (FEIS) document released in July 1999,
GNP developed a management philosophy and addressed eight critical issues in the park.
The GMP/FEIS states, "(T)he overwhelming majority of the people ...have indicated that
they would like to 'keep Glacier the way it is' ...[thus] (T)he park would retain its classic
character within the context of changing resource, social, and economic conditions while
continuing traditional visitor service and facilities...A management strategy...recognizes
the distinctive character of individual geographic areas within the park and the suitability
of various zones in these areas to provide for a range of visitor experiences" (National
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Park Service 1999:23). The GMP/FEIS claims the document now provides park
managers with a framework for making decisions about resource protection and visitor
use. However, dissatisfaction regarding a number of both substantive and processoriented items extended the process almost two years longer than planners had
anticipated and at a total cost of nearly $1.5 million.

J. Upper Clark Fork River Basin Management Plan
The Upper Clark Fork River basin, an area of about 6,000 square miles draining
the western slope of the northern Rocky Mountains, is a tributary of the Columbia River.
The Upper Clark Fork River basin is defined as the drainage area above Milltown Dam at
3,250 feet to its headwaters in the Anaconda-Pintler Wilderness at over 10,600 feet.
Decades of agricultural, industrial, domestic and municipal use had impaired the water
quality of the Upper Clark Fork River and turned this once pristine river into Montana's
"most abused river" (Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee 1994). The
Upper Clark Fork River and some of its 17 tributaries are plagued with problems
associated with toxic metal contamination, sedimentation and nutrient loading and has led
to issues of impaired aquatic and riparian habitat, decreased opportunities for recreation
and contaminated public water supplies (Maughan 1994). The Clark Fork River is now
the largest Superfund site in the United States with an active mitigation campaign
spearheaded by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
The river had also been under threat from chronic de-watering for beneficial uses,
and according to some, the basin in the 1980's was grossly over-appropriated (Upper
Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee 1994). In Montana, water reservations are
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the only legal means of securing water for aquatic and terrestrial health and recreation
purposes, known as instream water rights. Natural water quality is related to the flow in a
basin, ergo, a decreased flow tends to also decrease a river's capacity to assimilate
pollutants (McKinney and others 1989). Under the 1973 Montana Water Use Act. any
political subdivision or agency of the state or United States government may apply to the
Montana Board of Natural Resources and Conservation, the legal entity for granting
water reservations, to reserve water for both offstream or instream uses including
municipal growth or water quality. The application must be published in a newspaper
and affected persons must be notified. The board then adopts the reservation based on
proof provided by the applicant that there exists a need for the reservation, the amount of
water requested is necessary for the reservation, the reservation is in the public interest
and special criteria will be met if the use is to be out of state (McKinney and others
1989). An unsatisfactory decision by the board could be appealed to a district-level court
and then to the Montana Supreme Court.
After initiating an Environmental Impact Statement process, the Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (DFWP) submitted an application for instream
flow reservation in 1986 on about 25 stream segments representing about 2.5 percent of
the total stream miles of the Clark Fork River basin in the state (McKinney and others
1989). The following year, the Granite County Conservation District applied to reserve
water from several tributaries of the Upper Clark Fork River for a storage facility for
future irrigation use. In 1991, both of these cases were scheduled to go to a hearing
before the Montana Board of Natural Resources and Conservation. The expectation of a
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litigious situation (with a potentially expensive and uncertain outcome) convinced certain
stakeholders that a different settlement process may be necessary.
A committee was formed in 1988 by the private, non-profit organization Northern
Lights Institute (NLI) based in Missoula, Montana, to address Superfund cleanup of the
Upper Clark Fork River. After a year of work, the committee discovered that more
tangible results might ensue by tackling the issue of present and fiiture water allocations.
Noting the potential conflicts between DFWP and basin irrigators, NLI provided a forum
in which stakeholders slowly realized that civility rendered through informal discussion
was not only possible, but could indeed lead to a resolution. In 1990, the committee
published a report titled "State of the River" detailing concerns that had been brought up
during previous meetings. The idea of a basin closure to water reservations was put forth
and agreed to by committee members. Recognizing the efforts of the NLI initiative, the
Montana Legislature implemented most of the recommendations of the committee. On
May 1, 1991 by legislative decree, the basin was closed to new reservations and the
committee was officially recognized by the state government. With 21 members
(voluntarily containing nearly all of the original committee members) representing
irrigation, recreation, fisheries, mining, hydroelectric utilities, and state and local
government agencies, and with one facilitator, the committee became charged with the
following mandates: "(T)he steering committee shall complete an Upper Clark Fork
River basin comprehensive water management plan ...[that must] consider and balance all
beneficial uses of the water in the Upper Clark Fork River basin, ...identify and make
recommendations regarding the resolution of water-related issues in the Upper Clark
Fork River basin ...[and] complete and submit a management plan to the governor and the
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legislature by December 31, 1994" (MCA 85-2-335 to 338). It is important to note that
although the committee was under a mandate to produce a plan, there were no specific
conditions regarding the details or quality of the plan.
The Upper Clark Fork River Water Management Plan that the committee
produced was eventually ratified with little change by the 1995 Montana legislature and
signed into law. One of the most significant provisions of the plan was a controversial
ten-year water leasing pilot effort in which water rights could be temporarily transferred
from agriculture (holding the majority of water rights) to a public organization (such as
the state) or a private entity (such as Trout Unlimited) and used for instream flows during
the driest years. This agreement represented a tremendous step forward for collaborative
processes and according to Snow (1996b:24) "(T)he ten-year pilot provision gives succor
to those who want instream flows in the river, while at the same time demonstrating
agriculture's willingness to try an innovative solution to one of the West's most vexing
and longstanding environmental problems—namely, how to keep rivers biologically intact
while maintaining a secure economic base for agriculture and other water users." Most of
the original committee continues to regularly meet to the present to discuss topics of
water allocation and related natural resource management issues.

4. Blaclrfoot River Recreation Management Plan
In 1995, the Montaina Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks called together
various stakeholders to gain input on the recreational impacts that had occurred on the
Blackfoot River in western Montana. Input was sought because of the recent increases in
population in the region, recent widespread media coverage related to the river and the
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noticeable increase of anglers. The 132-mile Blackfoot River is a tributary of the Upper
Clark Fork River and transects land owned and managed by a variety of public and
private interests. These interests include the USPS (44 percent), private landowners (24
percent as both agricultural and non-industrial forest land), Bureau of Land Management
(20 percent), Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (7 percent)
and Plum Creek Timber Company (5 percent) (Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife
and Parks 1999).
A private consultant was hired to coordinate the recreation management planning
process. A Technical Advisory Committee and a Citizen Advisory Committee were
established, seven scoping meetings occurred and the Blackfoot River Recreation
Management Direction was produced and released in January, 1999. Officials with the
DFWP realized that the scoping sessions and Management Direction were inadequate in
order to formulate a comprehensive Recreation Management Plan and thus extended the
process by creating a Recreation Steering Committee to identify and specify a detailed
recreation management plan for the Blackfoot River.
The impetus for crafting this plan was further prompted by the Montana
legislature, who in 1999 produced a bill directing the DFWP to "...undertake a
comprehensive study of the Blackfoot River," to address "...the growing popularity of the
Blackfoot River and ways to mitigate conflict among landowners, outfitters, and private
recreationists, ways to protect the integrity of the river's resources, while continuing to
accommodate recreational use ...[and may] enlist the assistance of the governor's
consensus council, created pursuant to executive order, to organize discussions among all
interested parties" (House Bill 629). The bill requires that the study be presented to the
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57th legislature and include "...suggested legislation or department rules, if either are
warranted, to alleviate conflict, preserve the integrity of the resource, protect private
property rights, and ensure continued high-quality fishing, camping, and floating for
commercial and private recreational users" (House Bill 629).
In the simimer of 1999, the DWFP conducted a study, using a quantitative surve>'.
on recreation use on the river and began the creation of the Recreation Steering
Committee (RecSteerCom) to study in detail various issues relating to the river.
Recognizing that representing a diversity of opinion on the RecSteerCom was an
essential component of studying and resolving issues, members of the RecSteerCom were
appointed based on letters of interest submitted by individual stakeholders, with every
interest represented (W. Baxter, DFWP, personal commimication). The RecSteerCom is
made up of private landowners, commercial outfitters and constituents representing the
general public with assistance from federal and state government agency officials. The
issues confronting the RecSteerCom include creating a commercial use policy,
investigating use limitations on the river including a user fee system, determining access
and facility limits and needs and determining the RecSteerCom's role in water quality and
land use issues (Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1999:Appendix G).
The group has been meeting on a monthly basis through the spring of 2000 in a forum
that is advertised and open to the public.

Sampling
I used a purposeful sample of individuals involved with the study areas in order to
compile interview data related to the research objectives and working propositions. In
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addition, I incorporated a snowball sampling technique in which planners suggested other
individuals that could provide further insight or diversity of opinion. The purpose of this
sampling was not to determine the extent to which various experiences and meanings
were distributed across the population of natural resource plarmers, but rather sampling
captured the experiences of a range of planners selected for diversity. To achieve this
diversity, planners were chosen based on the characteristics of their involvement. 1
sought not only the prominent, outspoken or high-profile members of each planning
process, but also members who represented a diversity of opinion (for ex£imple,
adversaries who had submitted opposing alternatives for the Bitterroot Ecosystem Grizzly
Bear Recovery Process). A total of twenty-eight plaimers were interviewed.
While generalizations can be inferred to either other planners in the study areas,
other planners in similar plarming processes or natural resource plarmers in general,
caution should be exercised, especially in the latter case as this sample is small and nonrandom. The results from this study are not meant to be statistically generalizable, but
instead to capture the range of perceptions among the sampled individuals. Admittedly,
as Patterson and Williams (in review) attest, "(U)sing this sampling approach something
is lost - the ability to draw conclusions about how experiences are distributed across a
population. However, something is gained - by virtue of the smaller sample size the
researcher can employ approaches to data collection that allows a more in-depth
understanding of the phenomenon being studied."
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Data Collection
Interviews occurred between July 19, 1999 and December 3, 1999 and were tape
recorded and transcribed verbatim. Interviews were open-ended and flexible, allowing
the plarmer to elaborate on details and idiosyncrasies of their planning process or
personal planning paradigm while still focused to reveal relevant and comparable
information. I used a semi-structured interview process with an open-ended
questionnaire (see Appendix A). This method was coupled with probing in order to
uncover important points related to the research objectives and working propositions.
Interview questions were derived from literature related to the conceptual framework.
The interview process began with pre-planned questions and subsequent questions were
then spontaneous reactions to responses by the planner but still based on the interview
guide. Questions began with a broad theme and then developed into more specific detail
by way of probing. The questions served as a guide rather than a rigid framework and
thus the interview was approached as a conversation that was guided toward attaining
information relevant to the research objectives. Respondents were encouraged to
elaborate on specific issues relating to the research objectives and working propositions
recognizing that unique attributes would characterize each planner who was sampled.
Twenty-six of the interviews were conducted in person at a location chosen by the
planner. The two remaining interviews were accomplished via telephone.
Other sources of data used to supplement interview data included notes taken
during the interviews, observations of various publicly-held meetings pertaining to the
study areas and documents such as draft and final Environmental Impact Statements,
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summaries of public comments, newsletters, academic analyses, and newspaper and
journal articles that pertained to the study areas.

Data Analysis
The interview transcripts form the basis of the project data. Analysis began with
a thorough reading and understanding of the interview as a whole. Next, the interview
was analyzed to identify significant themes relevant to the research objectives and
working propositions. From the more than 40 hours of taped interviews, quotes within
the transcripts were excerpted, used to establish particular points of view and validate
results.
The goal of the analysis was to understand the perception of the plaiming
environment for each of the individuals who participated in or were intimately familiar
with one of the four study areas. The data analysis first incorporated a qualitative
approach followed by a quantitative process in order to address the working propositions.
The qualitative data incorporated an interpretivist methodology and provides the
foundation of the analysis. The interviews using the qualitative approach were viewed
more as an emergent narrative that was co-constructed by the interviewer and interviewee
(Patterson and others 1998) and thus provided "...the basis for a direct interpretation of a
complex unit of social interaction, in comparison to the standard approach where such
inferences are based on decontextualized bits and pieces" (Mishler 1986:241). The goal
of the interpretation was to outline and describe in rich detail the natural resource
planning environment while recognizing the conceptual framework underlying the
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research. Dominant themes emerged that defined the planner's perceptions of planning
and the planning environment.
The data analysis was based on an organizing system developed through a process
utilizing an index system, meaning xmits and thematic labels. The software package QSR
Nud*ist (ver. 4.0) was used to facilitate the creation of the index system. The index
system consisted of a numerical reference system sequentially identifying the location of
each sentence within the interview. The sentences were used as the base reference unit in
the index system for two reasons. First, a sentence is a unit of reference that expresses a
coherent idea. Second, sentences are small enough to facilitate ease of manipulation and
organization of data. The sentences were numbered in the order they appear in the
transcription.
The actual analysis began with the identification of meaning units within the
transcripts. The meaning units were typically made up of groups of sentences that were
comprehensible on their own and described or conveyed a coherent concept or belief
Later, thematic labels were developed which served to group the various meaning units
under similar topics based on my interpretation of the underlying concept relevant to my
research question that particular meaning units addressed. For instance, an excerpt
describing "negative aspects of NEPA" was construed to be an individual meaning unit.
This meaning unit was then grouped into the thematic label titled "Procedural
Obligations."
Data categorized by thematic label allowed for analysis both within (idiographiclevel) and between (nomothetic-level) planners. The first stage of the data analysis began
with an idiographic-level understanding of the individual planner in order to identify and
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establish each planner's perception of the planning environment and preference of
planning model. The second stage of the analysis was the nomothetic-level analysis that
pertains to both the amalgam of planners within one specific study area or, where patterns
were observed between many or all of the sampled planners, across several or all four of
the study areas. The patterns that emerged reveal consistencies between planners
regarding various themes. These patterns were noted in order to initiate the nomotheticlevel analysis. For instance, if many of the planners in a particular study area share
themes relating to "Dialogue" and "Respect," then a nomothetic-level assumption is made
that the process as a whole contained elements of social capital. If the majority of
planners in all four of the study areas described procedural obligations as constraining,
then the presumption is made that procedures are a constraining factor in other planning
processes with similar contexts.
The analysis of these data is presented in two different sections of Chapter Four:
Results. The first section presents an analysis of each study area and details the dominant
themes that were present to highlight particular elements that distinguish each study area.
The second section presents the quantitative analysis to test the working propositions.
The designation of both a planner (idiographic-level) as espousing or supporting a
particular theme or the description of an entire study area (nomothetic-level) possessing a
dominant theme is based on the intensity of the narrative or narratives describing the
theme. This intensity is described as the degree or strength and the quantity of the
comments made by the individual planner (for the idiographic-level analysis) or group of
planners (for the nomothetic-level analysis). The quantity is based solely on the total
number of instances a planner discussed a particular theme or how many total planners
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discussed a theme. Using the degree or strength and the quantity of comments as the
criteria by which idiographic and nomothetic-level analyses were performed allowed for
a thorough and systematic categorization of each planner and the amalgam of planners.
The excerpts chosen serve as a justification of the interpretations made regarding the
meaning units and themes. The choice of specific individual excerpts used is outlined in
greater detail in Chapter Four: Results.
In order to initiate the quantitative analysis to test the working propositions, each
of the plaimers was first categorized as either a synoptic or a transactive planner. This
categorization was based on specific themes identified within the transcripts describing a
planner's preferred or desired method of planning. Planners who consistently expressed
the general characteristics of either model of planning (see Table 1) were categorized as
either "Synoptic" or "Transactive." Planners who exhibited characteristics of both
models of planning were categorized as "Undetermined." Next, themes were identified
that categorized a planner as either agreeing or disagreeing with the commencing
statements of each of the working propositions (i.e. for Working Proposition One,
excerpts relating to the planners perception of procedural obligations would be sought
and analyzed). Once the appropriate data were associated with the working propositions,
the responses were coded with either a "1" or a "2" in order to facilitate statistical
analysis. The variable relating to "Synoptic," "Transactive" or "Undermined" model of
planning was termed "Desired Model." Seven cross-tabulations were performed between
variables representing each of the working propositions and the variable "Desired Model"
using the statistical software package SPSS for Windows (Release 9.0). A chi-square test
statistic was generated to gauge the significance of the test and indicate to what degree
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the sample data conforms to or "fits" the working propositions. For instances when the
assumptions of the chi-square test statistic were violated, the Kolmogorov-Smimov Z test
was used.

68

CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS

OVERVIEW OF RESULTS
This chapter presents resuhs from the qualitative and quantitative analyses. First,
the study areas are examined individually and characteristics of the process are discussed
and analyzed by the accounts given from the sampled individuals. The second analysis
examines the working propositions. Tables associated with the individual working
propositions are presented and illustrate the total numbers and percentages of planners
who favor a particular planning model and those who agree or disagree with the
commencing statements of each the working propositions. Where the tests are
significant, the results are discussed as they pertain to synoptic and transactive planners
and their respective positions regarding the working propositions. The names of the
study areas have been shortened when referencing a planner from a specific study area
and are as follows:
1. Bitterroot Ecosystem Grizzly Bear Recovery Process (Grizzly),
2. Glacier National Park General Management Plan (Glacier),
3 Upper Clark Fork River Basin Management Plan (Clark Fork),
4- Blackfoot River Recreation Management Plan (Blackfoot).
Several of the planners that I interviewed participated in more than one of the
study areas (specifically, planners involved with the Upper Clark Fork River Basin
Management Plan and the Blackfoot River Recreation Management Plan). These
individuals were instructed to comment and elaborate specifically on the study area that
they were most intensely involved in. While some of the planners in the study are
female, the majority of the planners are male (85.7 percent), owing to the paucity of
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gender diversity in these natural resource planning processes. However, when describing
perspectives from specific planners, the gender of the planner has in some instances been
changed in order to maintain anonymity. Table 4 illustrates the number and percentage
of planners interviewed across the four study areas.
Table 4. Breakdown of study interviewees.
Grizzly
Glacier
Clark Fork
# of Planners
7
7
9
Interviewed
% of Total
32.1
25
25

Blackfoot

Total

5

28

17.9

100

It is important to note that planners involved with the Upper Clark Fork River
Basin Management Plan were able to comment not only on the planning process in its
entirety but also its final outcome as this is the only study area of the four in which the
process had achieved a tangible outcome before the interviews took place. Each of the
remaining three study areas were in various stages of completion (detailed in Chapter
Three: Methods) and therefore planners were not able to speculate on its specific
outcome, although many were able to anticipate future actions and an end result. In the
case of the Bitterroot Ecosystem Grizzly Bear Recovery Process, the Final Environmental
Impact Statement was released after the last plarmer had been interviewed. The Glacier
National Park General Management Plan and the Final Enviroimiental Impact Statement
were released while interviews were taking place.
Plaimers were assured of confidentiality, thus the initial "P" and the interview
number is used to identify individual planners with specific excerpts from the
transcriptions. In addition, the sentence number from the index system of the transcribed
interview is provided at the end of the excerpt. This sentence number corresponds with
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the first sentence in the excerpt. This number is given in order for the reader to
distinguish if the excerpt is one continuous piece of text (in w^hich case only one number
is given) or if the text is several distinct excerpts from the transcription, in which case
two or more numbers are given to identify how much of a "gap" appears between the
different excerpts. The gaps are marked in the excerpts with an ellipsis (i.e.

In

several excerpts, I have included the question from the interview (indicated with a "Q ")
in order to clarify the response. Additional words or sentences are provided in brackets
(i.e."[ ]") to clarify or expand certain excerpts. In addition, descriptions of the acronyms
cited in the excerpts and throughout this study are provided (see Appendix B).

ANALYSIS OF STUDY AREAS
An analysis of each of the four study areas is presented below. In each of the
study area analyses, a general overview of the process is given. The overview is
followed by a series of dominant themes that emerged from the data and describe
significant characteristics of each process. The dominant themes also serve to distinguish
processes from each other. Excerpts are presented that justify the interpretation of the
theme.

1. Bitterroot Ecosystem Grizzly Bear Recovery Process
Overview
The Bitterroot Ecosystem Grizzly Bear Recovery Process has experienced
numerous delays including the release of the Final Environmental Impact Statement and
resulting Record of Decision for various reasons. The dominant themes that emerged
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from plamiers in this process were, 1) procedural obligations, 2) issues regarding goal
identification and agreement and, 3) mistrust. Constraints resulting from rigid procedural
obligations were claimed by all but two of the planners interviewed. The process was
mandated to follow a stringent agenda (leading to recovery) that seems to foment
agitation and sometimes civil disobedience. The public meeting process mandated by
NEPA according to one planner, "isn't a ftinctional way to do business" (PI2) and was
dominated by the inability to accommodate two-way dialogue because people
"grandstand" (P26) to promote their point. These processes promoted adversarial
relationships where public gatherings revealed only "the most polarized views" (PI2).
Timelines required prompt analysis of information collected at the various public
gatherings. The content analysis process after public meetings, hearings and scoping
sessions was problematic because "you get so much information coming at you" (P26)
that the task becomes "a pretty difficult thing" (P26). Fear of litigation according to one
planner, takes up a tremendous amount of agency time and the documents required under
NEPA "are not intelligible" (PI 7) to the general public.
In addition to procedural constraints, the inability of the agency and stakeholders
to identify or agree upon goals seems to have influenced the Grizzly process. Finally,
although trust was present and necessary in order for representatives of ROOTS to come
together and reach consensus, mistrust has pervaded the process among many of the
stakeholders and in many of the communities adjacent to the recovery area and as a
result, disrespect to federal employees occurs even outside of the work environment.
Many of the planners in the Grizzly process discussed a lack of dialogue and respect that
preoccupied their assignments. These elements appear linked to the mistrust among

many of the stakeholders. The Grizzly process has been mired in the potential for
litigation at various points in the process. The question of whether or not to reintroduce
grizzlies into the BE and how to do so remains the subject of signifiCMt public debate.

Dominant Themes
Procedural Obligations
Various constraints related to procedures mandated in the Grizzly process
appeared in nearly every interview from this study area. The issue was identified as one
that can restrict the process and outcome. PI2 explains that the mandated NEPA process
only promoted polarization within the communities and did not adequately represent the
community of interest.
I think the unfortimate part about our public system is the NEPA process - and all that guarantees is that you're going to find out the most polarized
views from everybody. It doesn't in any way get a cross-section of the
public ...What we get is the person who is willing to drive to Hamilton and
get up in front of the public and emotionally speak his piece, or who feels
strong enough that he'll write a letter and sign a petition. The average guy,
we don't hear from. We have no way of getting the average person's pulse
on this issue through the NEPA process. And that's a huge failure. All it is,
is guaranteeing that we'll get the most excited people on either side to
participate (PI2 Grizzly 217, 221).
P26 describes the process that followed the requirements of NEPA as being
unresponsive to issues that were raised in the middle of the process and explains that
NEPA is used in some cases as a cosmetic as opposed to a prescriptive process.
I'm pretty disillusioned with the whole NEPA process at this point. It's
been a long process. I think NEPA was a good idea and I think it still is a
good idea; in concept it's a good idea. But I think along the way it's lost
any ability to be a flexible process, to be a process that's really responsive
to issues that are raised in the middle of the process, or into the process.
It's just been bastardized essentially by the agencies that use it. I'm
thinking about the way that we go through the public comments and
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summarize them and do the content analysis on the public comments, and
I was involved in the content analysis on the draft EIS comments and. I
me£in, for the number of comments we got, 24,000 ...You get so much
information coming at you and it's really hard to carry that through. 1 had
to carry the information that I had in my head from all these comments to
the team, explain it, and then try and move that forward and bring them to
the Final [EIS]. It was a pretty difficult thing ...And the way that NEPA
currently is used is, it's sort of a tool to rationalize or prove, whatever the
science, to mold a document into justifying cutting the trees on this X
block of land, or putting bears into the Bitterroot - is definitely the right
thing to do. And I think the process is abused that way ...The Forest
Service does it all the time. I worked on timber sales where the ranger
wanted to go cut ~ had a target to cut a couple of million board feet of
timber, and he said, "okay" -- drew a circle on a map, "this is where we're
going to cut it." We built eight or nine alternatives, as we sat around the
table, we'd laugh as we built these alternatives, "let's build one for the
ORV group, let's build one for ~ make these people happy." Knowing the
whole time it's going to be this alternative which is what the ranger wants
and we're just doing the NEPA process to make it look good (P26 Grizzly
192, 197, 334).
PI6 explains that different EIS's associated with different projects tend to be
duplicative and thus confusing to the general public.
I think the real problem with the grizzly bear or the lynx or blackfooted
ferret or the prairie dog, all these major controversial issues is, the fact that
the EIS's and most of the major planning efforts are outside of the central
planning process. So you have an EIS over here for the bear and you have
an EIS to revise the forest plan. So you have duplicative efforts ongoing,
and 1 think this creates a great degree of confusion within the public,
within the planning process, and within the conservation effort (PI6
Grizzly 57^
The public meetings were not productive because according to P26, the forum
was a "one-way sort of process" that stifled communication and did not encourage
information exchange and instead promoted "grandstanding."
I mean we've done the mandatory public involvement steps, but we haven't
really gone beyond, as far as a lot of outreach activity to people, roundtabletype meetings in communities and that sort of thing. I think we could have
done a better job in that way ...I don't think those [public meetings] were
very productive. It was a one-way sort of a process where people would
come and you would give them five minutes and they would speak their
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piece, and next and next. And I don't think we ever had a two-way kind of
dialogue, and I think our end-product here, being the EIS, could have been
maHp a much better document that would have been more responsive to
public concerns and issues had we had more of a two-way dialogue ...and a
lot of people when they get up in front of a crowd just want to grandstand.
Their input is not really terribly productive as far as addressing issues (P26
Grizzly 108, 142,145).
PI 7 explains that the fear of litigation takes up a tremendous amount of agency
time and consequently, the documents produced "are not intelligible" and read by only
"professionals" and thus the procedural complexities do not lend themselves to
communication with the public.
...the level of disclosure in NEPA documents [EIS] is so high because
agencies are afraid that they'll be litigated for insufficiency of not doing a
sufficient analysis, not examining all the alternatives, and not considering
key features, that they spend a lot of their time on the paperwork side of it,
and not as much on the substantive side. Frankly, these documents are not
intelligible to a lot of people. I don't know how many people, other than
professionals, read them (PI7 Grizzly 250).
Goal Identification or Agreement
Every planner in the Grizzly process commented in some regard that goal
identification or agreement was an issue that had affected the planning environment. In
this first example, P12 explains that politicians in Idaho prevented the involvement of
state Fish and Game personnel in the planning process even though certain Fish and
Game personnel favored grizzly bear recovery and wanted to participate.
...subsequent to the initiation of the process, about half way through the
draft process, the political forces in the State of Idaho intervened and
directed that the Fish and Game in Idaho not participate any more. So
they haven't participated because they were politically removed from the
process. In that regard, there has not been agreement among the
politicians in Idaho, but certainly the Fish and Game people agreed that it's
something that should be done, but the politicians didn't agree (PI2
Grizzly 22).
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PI 7 states that the grizzly bear recovery is extremely controversial and thus, a
program should have been developed that recognized the implications of the controvers>.
I'd say that this probably is about as controversial a restoration effort as
you could have and there are a considerable number of people who think
bears shouldn't be restored under any circumstances and they're very
wedded to that viewpoint (PI7 Grizzly 27).
Mistrust
The last dominant theme relating to the Grizzly process is the issue of trust.
Nearly every planner described the air of mistrust present among some factions of the
public and certain government employees. Several planners elaborated on the adversity
that led to a tenuous working enviroimient both at public gatherings relating to the
process and in non-work related settings. P26 describes one event that took place in a
rural town near the recovery area where federal employees work and shop.
When I was there, there was the story of one of our secretaries who went
into town to buy a pair of shoes. And went into a shoe store that had the
sign in the window that this business is supported by timber dollars. And
she went in to buy a pair of shoes and they said, "we don't sell shoes to your
kind, the Forest Service" (P26 Grizzly 300).
P12 describes the public education and outreach attempted by a federal agency
and that these attempts drew criticism.
...we face the problem of dealing with people who already have their
minds made up and no matter what we tell them, they don't believe you.
And we get accused of things that we never did. We had some kind of a
meeting in Hamilton and brought in some people that live with grizzly
bears in the Swan Valley, and it was kind of a community thing where
they wanted people that were there in the Bitterroot Valley to have the
opportunity to listen to somebody who lives in grizzly bear habitat and is
not too worried about grizzly bears. So they brought a couple of ranchers
down there, and some members of this group, "Citizens Against Grizzlies"
accused us of staging this and having these people do it so we could
manipulate public opinion (PI2 Grizzly 168).
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2. Glacier National Park General Management Plan
Overview
Planners involved with the Glacier National Park General Management Plan
primarily raised concerns regarding poor internal and external relations with fellow
planners and stakeholders. Consequently, the dominant themes relating to this process
concern 1) power, 2) goal identification and agreement, 3) mistrust and, 4) practical
utility of the product.
Nearly every planner discussed the notion of power. However, this power is
described in diverse and even antithetical terms in that different planners elaborated on
either being controlled by or wanting to control aspects of the process. Another
prominent theme was goal identification and agreement. Several planners noted that this
issue was responsible for confusion within the team and with the public. In addition,
narratives relating to trust were mentioned by nearly every planner in this process. These
individuals felt that the public trust was violated after the release of Newsletter Three.
Others describe the lack of trust exhibited by upper management toward the planning
team. Several planners also commented on the utility of the General Management Plan
and Final Environmental Impact Statement, whether the document was worth the time
and effort and exactly how pragmatic the document would be regarding future planning
and management of the park.
In the excerpts below, the term "upper management" is used in brackets when
planners describe the individuals or groups of individuals working in the upper echelons
of park management who include Division Chiefs, the Superintendent and other highranking administrators within the National Park Service.
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Dominant Themes
Power
The first dominant theme of this process relates to power. There are two different
views of power; individuals or groups of individuals who controlled the process or those
who wanted to control the process. The majority of the planners who discuss these power
issues elaborated on the notion of being controlled and perceiving an over-exertion of
power by [upper management].
This first excerpt details the sentiments of a planner who felt controlled by [upper
management]. P5 perceives an over-exertion of power by [upper management] and
explains that as a member of the planning team, input mattered little since [upper
management] would decide issues regardless of the team's input. P5 further elaborates
that [upper management] had historically viewed collaborative decision-making as
threatening and feared a loss of control.
I think Glacier has had a long, long history of very autocratic managers.
And the perception from the beginning on the part of many of the Park
staff, was that their involvement didn't really matter ~ they would give
their opinions and they would give their ideas, but it really wouldn't matter
because in the long run, [upper management] would just decide what they
want to do and do it anyway. ...I think planning by nature is a loss of
control because plarming has to be collaborative if it's going to work.
[Upper management], as a rule, is not [upper management] because they
have been collaborative in their careers. Most of [upper management] is
pretty autocratic, and having to go through a very collaborative planning
process where you have to trust groups of people and the public and the
political environment to help you make decisions, is very threatening. ...I
think planning in general threatens managers because it has to be
collaborative, and that represents loss of control (P5 Glacier 126, 378,
389).
P3 in contrast, views an exercise of power as justifiable and preferable due to the
superiority of scientific or technical authority over mere "personal preference." P3
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describes the issue of incorporating public opinion within the decision-making process
and explains that public opinion is often not "practical" and must be "tempered" by his
own skills denoting an air of omniscience in the planning and decision-making process.
There is a point at which management decisions come into play and
obviously people that are trained in park management and are park
professionals have to weigh what the public says, which quite often is
either personal preference or opinion or because they have not managed
parks is not very practical. You have to kind of weigh that and try to
incorporate that and temper it with your management skills (P3 Glacier
147).
Goal Identification or Agreement
The next dominant theme that emerged involves the ability to identify and agree
upon goals and the resulting actions. PI explains that there existed deficiencies regarding
the identification of goals and this in turn affected the ability to communicate. He
explains that [upper management] would review and change the goals that would in turn
cause confusion among planning team members.
I think [there was] a lack of a clear idea of what we [the planning team]
wanted the plan to do and how it was going to do it. Disagreements right
up to end about what [upper management] wanted out of it or what they
were willing to put in there ...But when you put out a very broad-based
general plan, how can you argue with, "we want to preserve the resources
or conserve the scenery unimpaired for ftiture generations." I mean that is
basically restating the parks mission ...It is no wonder it was hard to
communicate, because we didn't know. The communication with the
public wasn't the problem, it was having everybody clearly understanding
what we [the planning team] were doing before we communicated [to the
public]. How the plan looked, was evolving as we were going along and
that did conftise people ~ it confused people on the staff. And it was
confusing to even the people who were working continuously on a day to
day basis (PI Glacier 82, 89, 121).
P3 explains that members of the planning team were unclear about what they
were hoping to achieve and in particular, the inability of [upper management] to
articulate their expectations of the plan.
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But, laying on top of that was even a bigger problem, and I am sure you
have heard about this if you have interviewed quite a few other people, is
with the park management team [planning team], particularly [upper
management] seemed to be very unclear about what they wanted. We
kept going through these exercises where we would develop something
that we thought was along the lines of what they wanted and they would
look at it and say that they didn't want that and that was totally wrong and
that wasn't what they were after (P3 Glacier 79).
PI elaborates that because goals were not agreed upon, the necessary time was
underestimated and the allotted budget of the process was exceeded.
We exceeded the budget, it took almost four years. It turned out to be
much more ~ what we failed to do is, we could sit around at the beginning
and say, "everybody is going to have to participate in this, some people up
to fifty percent of their time." That never happened. Some people spent a
hundred percent of their time and then others were constantly catching up
or maybe we wasted some time, but I think there was a gross
underestimate of the time involved, particularly because we were not so
clear about the methodologies and the end points of what we wanted to
achieve with the plan (PI Glacier 392).
This next planner believes that finding the overall vision of the park proved
difficult because of the multiple definitions of how the park should be managed.
You've got to remember, Yellowstone National Park has no General
Management Plan, and part of the reason is, I think what we found here in
Glacier, orihese other big parks like Grand Canyon and places like that,
it's just very difficult to get a comprehensive, overall vision of how a park
should be when so many different parts of the public look at it so
differently (Pll Glacier 100).
Mistrust
This next theme relates to mistrust. However, the discussion is focused on both
mistrust within the NPS planning team and the public perception of trust. In the first two
excerpts, planners discuss violating the public trust. In this first example, PIO explains
that the trust of the public was "squandered" with the release of Newsletter Three and
consequently was difficult to reestablish.
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We wasted, squandered a Lot of goodwill with the public by presenting
Newsletter Three the way we did. I think we missed the point on the
spectnmi where we should have been engaged in a productive discussion
with the public. I think we missed that so much that we created a lot of
distrust. And goodwill is something that is very hard to build up and
doesn't take much to erode it. And 1 think we really eroded a lot of that in
that process. And some of the things we've done since then. We've really
gotten cross-wise with the public on it. I don't think you get that back
very easily (PIO Glacier 220).
P2 describes the "big mistake" involving the release of Newsletter Three in which
the relationship between park planners and the public was diminished and resulted in an
erosion of trust and the promotion of skepticism.
...and once you've broken their [the public] trust, and I think in Newsletter
Three we broke their trust, it doesn't make any difference what you say or
do there. They're going to be very skeptical. I think a mistake in the
planning process, honestly that was made, and I'm in my [age] and I've
been doing government work since I was in my [age], I think we made a
big mistake, a big, big, big mistake in assuming that the public was going
to buy some of these far-out alternatives. I think we would have been far
better off internally, and this isn't what the planners tell you, but sort of
doing a reality check and saying, "we're not going to put alternatives in
there, like closing the Camas Road." Come on, that thing doesn't have a
snowball's chance in hell of ever becoming reality. We get the Chamber
in Columbia Falls angry with us. We get the Congressional folks angry
with us. We get people driving the North Fork angry, so why put it in?
Even though some people are saying the Park should be managed more as
a wilderness and there should be more emphasis on muscle-powered
recreation as opposed to gas-powered, that thing [Newsletter Three] didn't
stand a snowball's chance in hell (P2 Glacier 303).
In the next two excerpts, P5 discusses the lack of trust within the plaiming team.
First, he notes that mistrust was present because members were chosen based on
availability and not on their abilities to work on the team.
We were trying to build that ownership, but we had a lot of resistance and
a lot of distrust from the very, very first workshop. And the core team, my
impression at least is, the core team of park staff people were selected
based on who had the time to devote to this, not based on the people who
might be the best at it. And that was another mistake, that later on we
realized we should have paid a lot more attention to who it was the Park
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was putting on that core team. I think those people were not necessarily
the most trusted by their own staff, nor were they the people that felt the
most confident in dealing with this stuff (P5 Glacier 97).
When describing the dynamics among plarming team members. P5 elaborates on
the amount of distrust present and that the team acted like "dysfunctional families"
because of competition among planners who were members of various divisions of the

I think the biggest word that I can apply there was distrust. I always had
the feeling that the different staff members didn't trust each other. In the
Park staff, the plan is only a part of big piece of what they do. So you're
always dealing with the general background modes of operation in a park,
and I'm becoming convinced that this is true of all large parks, that they
have been in competition with each other for so many years from division
to division, and individual to individual in terms of trying to get
manpower and time and priority and management attention and all of that,
they're like big, huge dysfunctional families. And in a plaiming situation,
I think that just becomes exacerbated because of the need for planning to
be really collaborative. At Glacier, it seems to be in an especially big
problem and I could never figure out exactly why, but I think there's been
a history of management there that has not built £iny kind of collaborative
ways of doing business (P5 Glacier 142).
Practical Utility of Product
The last theme relates to the utility of the final product. This theme was identified
by several of the planners and is best articulated by P3 in the text below.
In the end, the whole sad thing about it, I think the end-product, it really
isn't much, it doesn't do a lot for the park. All of the major issues were not
addressed. The really big issues in managing Glacier in the future are not
addressed in that GMP. You take any of them, like the hotels are falling
apart, dilapidated. That's a big issue for the park and how are they going
to deal with the future of those hotels? That is not sufficiently addressed
in there. No decisions have been made. The Going-to-the-Sun Road —
how is that going to be handled? Not only in terms of rebuilding the road
but how are we going to provide for crowding into the future on that road?
It's not really dealt with sufficiently in there. Any of those issues ~ the
crowding and the campgrounds at Avalanche ~ none of that. So, all of the
major issues facing the park, in my mind, are not addressed. And sadly,
what we really started out to do with the VERP process is to define the
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visitor experience and have measurable standards. That is not included.
The whole thing in my mind is a real sad waste of — I guess it updates and
rubber-stamps what is going on in the park but it is not the innovative,
exciting management plan that we all envisioned at the beginning (P3
Glacier 283).

3. Upper Clark Fork River Basin Management Plan
Overview
The primary tangible outcome of the Clark Fork process was the Upper Clark
Fork River Basin Water Management Plan that was ratified by the Montana Legislature
in 1995. The process illustrates that agreements can be made in a complex, value-based
arena among previously entrenched adversaries indicating that a diverse assemblage with
seemingly polar interests can fimction together and produce lucid results.
The intangible details identified by the sampled plarmers allow for additional and
perhaps more insightful interpretation of the process. The dominant themes of the Clark
Fork process centered on 1) dialogue, 2) trust, 3) respect, 4) creativity and 5) learning.
These themes seem to build upon each other and relate to the promotion of social capital.
One planner elaborates on the notion that a "generative struggle" (P25)
engendered a situation in which participants "really have some freedom to move, to
experiment" (P25). Dialogue occurred because regular meetings afforded the opportunity
for "opening up avenues for communication" (P24). Dialogue next led to "the breeding
of trust" (P25) because through "face-to-face personal, fi-equent contact" (P25) people
were able to understand "motivations and desires and mandates" (P25). In addition, trust
enabled discussions not only specific to the river, but to other natural resource issues in
the basin. This is exemplified by the planner who noted that the meetings at times led to
discussions of "elk and about other issues ...over coffee at the breaks" (P24) adding that
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the process "provides a good forum for a lot of different issues that have come up" (P24).
Trust then seems to have allowed for and promoted mutual respect, where individuals
could not only tolerate the opinion of others, but could also champion the cause of other
members. One planner commented that the forum provided a place where members who
in the past "had been enemies, actually became the strongest supporters of each other,
and each other's interests" (P20). Several planners explained that the process allowed for
flexibility that led in turn to innovation and creativity. This led to shared learning where
information brought to the table "was generally accepted" (P20). Thus, many of the
outcomes are components that characterize the ftmdamental tenets of transactive planning
and social capital.
Few major constraints were identified by planners involved in the Clark Fork
process. It appears that through the collaborative efforts of the committee, constraints
including those associated with litigation were avoided. Several planners did however
comment on the Superfund status of the river and the inability of the committee to work
toward a solution because of the complexity of understanding and mitigating the issue.
Yet, this did not impede the objectives and resulting management plan crafted by the
committee to deal with water rights and instream flows.

Dominant Themes
Dialogue
In this first theme, P24 details his reluctance to work in the Clark Fork process but
over time saw the benefits of the meetings that led to creating avenues for discussion.
...I was against doing this, to be real fi-ank with you, I was against going to
the Committee and not going through the [formal] reservations [process],
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because I thought that we had a real good case. But 1 guess looking back on
it, I think probably this was the correct route to take. That over the long
haul, we're going to be able to do more than we would ever have been able
to do through the reservations. Because the reservations most likely, even if
it hadn't gone to court, would have ended up creating barriers to
communications, not opening up avenues for communications (P24 Clark
Fork 224).
P20 states that members of the Clark Fork process wanted to avoid large, formal
public meetings and thus espoused a forum made up of a small group of people that
represented constituencies. He notes that the meetings were always informal and open to
the public and describes the problems of traditional natural resource plarming processes
that utilize public meetings to comment on proposed actions.
...if you have huge audiences, you never really get a dialogue. Basically,
what you get are opinions stated back and forth ...like some of the old
public scoping meetings, or EIS meetings, where you go in and say "here's
my document, tell me what you don't like about it." That stimulates
people standing up and giving a long list of problems they don't like.
Sometimes those problems are invented just to confound the process
because they don't want the outcome. It really isn't a dialogue. It's playing
a game to try to meet your end (P20 Clark Fork 180, 188).
Trust
The previous theme describing dialogue appears to be associated with trust in the
case of the Clark Fork process. P25 explains that trust was an integral component of the
process and that frequent personal contact allowed for and promoted trust and a sense of
understanding about the motivations of others in the group.
One of the things that happened in this project, and we hear about this all
the time in collaboratives, and sometimes it's true and sometimes it's not,
this was a case in which I would say it was true, trust developed and grew.
By having that face-to-face personal, frequent contact, the people came to
understand — the people at the table came to understand some things about
each other's motivations and desires and mandates, and the dues they had
to pay to their constituencies that they did not understand going into the
project. With the understanding, we saw the breeding of trust and it rose
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at times palpably to the project. One of those ideas was that trust had to
be there (P25 Clark Fork 24).
The environment that Northern Lights Institute provided instilled a sense of trust
which had implications not only for drafting the Upper Clark Fork River Basin
Management Plan but also provided a forum for discussions about other subjects.
You'd be surprised at how many times we got into discussions about elk
and about other issues that the Department [DFWP] was heavily involved
in, in that upper basin. And they'd end up coming on the table and we'd
talk about them, or we'd talk about them over coffee at the breaks and stuff
like that. And I think by my being able to develop some level of trust with
these people, I think that also then transfers into other dealings the
Department has ...It really provides a good forum for discussing anything.
The Steering Committee has been a forum for a lot of different issues that
have come up (P24 Clark Fork 64, 70).
P22 explains that trust was established because funding came from a non-profit
organization and not from a government entity.
Had we [the Steering Committee] been funded by State Govenmient, I
don't think we would have developed the trust level, because money and
power go together in most people's minds. The golden rule is, he who has
the gold rules. And most people, I think, assume that at least a little bit.
There was no money from State Government involved in supporting
Northern Lights. Northern Lights did not have a clear agenda with respect
to these issues one way or the other (P22 Clark Fork 193).
Respect
The flexible environment that promoted dialogue and trust within the Clark Fork
process related to feelings of mutual respect. P23 articulates this notion in that an air of
respect enabled people to not only discuss ideas, but to champion the opinions of others.
In the end, [committee member name] was there arguing for our side and
we were arguing stuff for [committee member name] too. It's the people
stuff. I don't think it's any secret that's generally the best thing that comes
out of here (P23 Clark Fork 215).
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P20 explains that during one open meeting of the Clark Fork process, dissenting
insinuations were made at various committee members by members of the public.
Members of the conmiittee who had traditionally been adversaries were now supporting
each other.
And at that meeting, I watched those two [committee members] being
advocates to each other, and being team spokesmen for each other, that I
am sure that moved into many, many other discussions and debates in
other forms ...[there were] numerous times that I could see that occurring
in public forums where people who traditionally had been enemies,
actually became the strongest supporters of each other, and each other's
interests (P20 Clark Fork 592, 601).
Creativity
P25 suggested the idea of creativity that resulted from dialogue. He implies that
flexibility led to iimovation in that the committee had the flexibility that allowed
innovation and creativity to take place. He explains that individuals meeting in this
process offered a way,
...to come up with solutions through some kind of generative struggle, a
struggle that bred creativity. And I think the power of that creativity is a
very hopeful thing. It makes me optimistic that if people can be given
some room, some latitude, to operate in the collaborative vein, that the one
thing we hoped of collaboration would indeed come true, and that is, these
are not arenas of compromise. These are best thought of as arenas of
innovation ...Innovation implies that you really have some freedom to
move, to experiment, and to think up initiatives without somebody saying,
"Well, we can't do that because of, 'name your favorite US Code
Annotated Statute.'" Innovation requires flexibility (P25 Clark Fork 36,
206).
Learning
It can be inferred that the previous narratives are linked to shared learning. P20
provides evidence that learning took place as a result of the group field trips. These
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shared learning experiences created an environment where information that was
necessary for the drafting of the plan became accepted instead of disputed.
So with this type of process, the fact that these people see each other every
day, they're able to sort of do shared learning. They take each other on
tours. They bring forward issues. They share visions. That sort of shared
learning process opens doors that otherwise never get opened. It's never
put on the table. ...instead of watching the study take place, it was more of
a shared learning experience where you went out and did a tour on the
ground looking at irrigation. So it became sort of learning tours together,
watching and looking at things together. And then when we started
writing the plan itself ...they [committee members] had been introduced to
the topic. It [information] was generally accepted, and it [the plan] went
together real fast ...So when the plan was assembled, we weren't seeing
that [contention over information] issue (P20 Clark Fork 92, 445, 475).

4. Blackfoot River Recreation Management Plan
Overview
An overall description of the Blackfoot River Recreation Management Plan is the
most difficult of the four study areas to present and summarize. While the process
appears the least contentious of the study areas in this research and has yet to reach
fruition, an overview of the process at its current state can be made. Three dominant
themes were present in the data and include, 1) procedural obligations, 2) inflexibility
and 3) goal identification and agreement.
The process is contained spatially in a relatively small geographic area and is
affecting comparatively fewer stakeholders than any of the other study areas. In addition,
the probability for litigation appears low. Several planners identified the difficulty in
analyzing the data collected at the scoping sessions that were held and questioned
whether the issues brought forth were representative of the general public. Inferences
were made that the amoimt of time and funding that was necessary to insure an adequate

product was misjudged. Several planners commented that the lack of agreement or
inability to identify goals was problematic and affected the utility of the consultant in the
early stages of the process, thus resulting in a product that was inadequate. Goal
identification and agreement was, according to some of the planners, a priority of the
newly-formed Recreation Steering Committee.
The outcomes of the Blackfoot process are undetermined since the process is still
evolving and progressing toward the objective of producing a management plan. The
present Recreation Steering Committee meetings appear to incorporate many
characteristics of a transactive process including two-way dialogue, social learning and
the recognition of the legitimacy of many forms of knowledge. Several planners
commented on the potential of the Recreation Steering Committee and the positive
aspects of the envirorraient in which the plan would be written including identifying and
including all stakeholders, scheduling meetings at regular intervals, allowing the
meetings to be informal and open to the public and willing to solicit public information
and scrutiny throughout the process.

Dominant Themes
Procedural Obligations
The first dominant theme relates to constraints from procedural obligations. In
this first excerpt, although a scoping meeting was held to identify issues and problems,
the process was difficult because according to PI5, the planners had difficulty trying to
condense the information and "regurgitate" it back to the public. This excerpt implies a
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problem with the agency's abiHty to discern public sentiment and future goals using a
scoping process.
After we had completed those scoping meetings, I had a good feeling
about where we were headed and what was going on, and I felt that we
had captured a fairly good feedback from the public. I think the public
really came out and said, "here's a problem, here's a problem, and here's a
problem." And they weren't bashful in telling us that. I thought that was
great. The part that was maybe hard was then trying to condense that
information and to get that information into something that we could
regurgitate back out and say this is what we heard. And you know when
you do that, again it's a person's interpretation. So did we truly capture the
essence of what was being told to us, or didn't we. You always worry
about that (PI5 Blackfoot 112).
The next planner also implies a difficulty with using the public meetings process
to solicit information and expresses concern with the procedure as to the overall
representation of people who attended.
We kind of found that out in scoping meetings, but there again I'm first to
admit that we weren't really getting a real good coverage of the overall
population that uses that river. Those public meetings probably were
biased towards some groups of users over other groups which weren't
represented at all. Yeah, like any type of natural resource planning
process, the planner finds out right off the bat that there's those extremes
in the public (P4 Blackfoot 54).
Inflexibility
This planner observes that the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks seems to
have run into problems with its commitment to seeing the process through to fruition and
that projections of funding, timeframes and necessary personnel committed by the agency
were inadequate. Further, the planning process was not a priority to the agency and was
"shuffled to the bottom of the pile a number of times."
This particular project, it seems to go in spits and spurts and stutters. It
will see quite a bit of activity at certain times, and then, for instance, this
summer, its been almost nothing happening, and that's been pretty
frustrating for some people, who were involved early on and were pretty
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intensely interested and are willing and wanting to participate, that the>''ve
kind of felt like, what's happened to it ...And I think the Department
people are focused on recreational issues on the ground, on the river, at the
access points. And they don't have the time to deal with all this, and they
are understaffed in the sense that ~ there have been a couple of things that
have happened that I feel have had an impact on the process itself. We've
had some pretty major changes in leadership in the region and in Helena,
and that's definitely had an impact on how this has progressed, as it moves
through the various levels. Particularly this particular draft. God, it took
forever to get this thing up to Helena and then back to the Region and it
made that trip two or three times, and I guess that's part of the process
...On this particular process, I think the thought of doing this, the ideals
that were behind it, kind of got ahead of the practical realities of funding,
timeframes, personnel, particularly in the Department. They have a lot on
their plate to deal with, and I think this got shuffled to the bottom of the
pile a number of times. On this particular process, I don't think they had
enough money to carry it forward the way they had anticipated they
wanted to do it, and I think they got kind of what they paid for, and I think
they ran into some real problems. They had to shift gears and back up and
move forward, and move around, and in some places it just flat stalled out
because they did not ~ apparently did not ~ have it that well planned out
and committed to early on and so it ran into some troubles (P6 Blackfoot
121, 162,338).
PI5 explains that the agency was naive regzirding the budget to produce the
management direction. He explains that the funds ran out and the agency was left with
an unfinished project.
I think we were a little naive and when I say "we" I guess I'm kind of
saying the agency, and somewhat myself, a little naive on the amount of
money that it would take to do a really thorough, full job. You always try
to scrimp and save and in the process of doing that, you don't get a full
project. You don't get the end product that you're looking for. And I think
that's part of what happened here, is that we weren't adequately funded for
doing the job and so the consultant came along, did what he perceived he
needed to be doing, and then we ran out of money and the project still
wasn't done (PI5 Blackfoot 36).
Goal Identification or Agreement
P6 discusses the issue that specific goals were generally not agreed upon and
believes this issue in the future will be a great obstacle for the DFWP.
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I'm not sure we even could agree on specific detailed goals. We kind of
agreed on the fact that we wanted to protect the natural amenities of the
river and the environs, the habitat. We wanted to protect the experience
that most of us have had at certain times in our lives on the river. Exactly
how that was going to be done ~ we threw out or took in. I guess.
alternatives from various members of the public and various members of
the committee as to issues that were of concern. And there was a
tremendous variation as to perception as to what could or should be done.
Amazing, in my opinion, how you could have outfitters ~ sincerely have
totally opposite opinions as to what the problems were and what should be
done about them. I think the Department has its work cut out for it (P6
Blackfoot 37)
PI 5 believes that some of the problems associated with the consultant were a
result of not knowing "where this thing was going" and recognizes that the perception of
the agency is not necessarily the perception of the "world." He states that the agency was
uncertain as to the direction of the process and the definition of the problem.
We had good communications [with the consultant], but I think it was
more of a matter of not knowing where this thing was going, and not
knowing exactly what we needed. ...and maybe that was part of our
weakness, is that we didn't really up front say, "this is the problem and
here's the proof that we've got the problem." Although I think we tried to
capture the essence of what was going on out there, and obviously that
was probably our perception, not necessarily the world's perception (PI5
Blackfoot 65, 97).

ANALYSIS OF WORKING PROPOSITIONS
This next section presents the analysis of the working propositions and is divided
into two separate segments. The first segment describes the categorization of each
planner as either a synoptic or a transactive planner and presents excerpts from several of
the interviews to support the classifications. The next segment provides evidence of
planners who either agree or disagree with the commencing statements in each of the
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working propositions. Again, excerpts from the interviews are provided to support the
classifications.
I have categorized all of the planners as either being a "Synoptic" or "Transactive
planner. These categorizations are based on an overall interpretation of the planner's
desired model of planning. However, in ten of the twenty-eight interviews (32.1%). it
was not possible to categorize the planner as strictly synoptic or transactive because of
contradictory or ambiguous statements in the transcripts. In these cases, the planner was
categorized as "Undetermined." Details of the rationale for the categorizations are
presented below. Table 5 presents a breakdown of planners by study area categorized as
either "Synoptic," "Transactive" or "Undetermined."
Table 5. Breakdown of synoptic and transactive planner by study area.
Grizzly
Glacier Clark Fork Blackfoot Total % of Total
5
Synoptic
0
17.9
5
0
0
14
Transactive
7
3
50
3
1
Undetermined
9
32.1
6
0
2
1
Total
7
28
9
7
5
% of Total
25
17.9
32.1
25
100
-

-

The working propositions that are supported are discussed and interpreted relating
to the study areas and to planners who favor either synoptic or transactive planning
models. Examples of each of the planning models are given to illustrate the definition of
either model. In the examples below, the desired model is either a model that is favored
for some future process or a reference to the current process that the planner is engaged in
and supports.
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Description of Synoptic Models of Planning
The first set of examples involve the synoptic model as the desired model of the
plaimer. Here, the plaimers relate perspectives of a desired model of planning that
stresses periodic engagement wdth the public, a top-down power structure, one-way
dissemination of information, and relies on technology, objectivity and pluralism to
achieve goals.
In the first example, P7 implies that his desired model involves having the agency
"checkup" on the public and have the public "react" to plans.
Once you've got some issues identified, I think it's worthwhile to go back
to the public at kind of an intermediate stage and it seems to me that often
doesn't occur, especially in big federal EIS processes. It's important to go
back at kind of the intermediate phase and show the public what you think
you've captured, ask them, "this is what we think we heard from you, these
are the issues that we were able to compile fi-om our meetings and surveys,
and whatever, did we get it right?" So that's a little different role than the
initial scoping phase. Kind of a checkup. Then again, the public plays a
different role again when you're further down the road and you've got a
draft plan for people to react to (P7 Blackfoot 88).
In the next example of a synoptic model, P12 of the Grizzly process explains that
the scoping method was an appropriate approach that allowed the planners to "consider"
the concerns of the public and to "reinforce" the planner's own issues associated with the
process.
I think the scoping was an adequate way to get the public involved. We
got lots of comments from people. The purpose of scoping is not to
hammer down all the final issues. It's to let people have the opportunity to
make sure that we consider their concerns, and I think that we did consider
their concerns. I mean, public safety was a big issue. Economic impacts
was a big issue. We could have figured that without going on scoping
meetings, but it's good to have that reinforcement by listening to people
and getting their concems. So I think the scoping process was very
valuable in letting us know what the public wanted in this document. It
also allowed us to get those alternatives from groups that were pretty well

Q4
organized and I think they were pretty shocked that we took their
ahematives and just put them in the document (PI2 Grizzly 69).
The next example of a synoptic model is presented by P3 fi-om the Glacier
process, who criticizes [upper management] as the cause for the problems with the
General Management Plan. The implication here is that the planner is concerned with an
incidental-level perception of a problem (i.e. the personalities) and does not comment on
the inability to incorporate a social learning model with the public.
I am not sure I would have done anything differently. It was the
personalities involved more than anything. If I could change anything at
all I would have changed [upper management]. I think [upper
management] didn't work with the team. I don't think they were able to
express ideas. This sounds like a pretty bad condemnation of [upper
management] but they just weren't effective. I think they were pretty
domineering. I don't think they utilized the rest of their management team
effectively or allowed their use effectively. But, overall I think the
process was the right one. We went to the public, we formed some
groups, we held scoping. I just think we didn't have good guidance, from
[upper management]. The process was confused as I said initially. We
weren't sure of the steps (P3 Glacier 94).
The last example of a planner favoring the synoptic model is PI who explains that
the most desirable process is a "hybrid" type that incorporates public participation "more
efficiently" yet still allows the Park Service to maintain "control."
So, if we had to put together some sort of a management group, like they
did with the Bob Marshall, I don't believe it would be possible. I
understand what they're trying to do and I understand people's resistance
to it, but I think there's probably a third way that combines the interested
involvement rather than just the shouting matches that occur at public
meetings. You're not going to get anything from the guy that says "the
federal government should be abolished," who is anti-government. So
there's probably some middle ground that's some hybrid of using public
participation more effectively at certain points, but retaining the right to
control how it goes (PI Glacier 324).
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Description of Transactive Models of Planning
-

The next set of examples illustrates a planner's view of a transactive model. In

these examples, planners are oriented toward methods that promote two-way dialogue.
mutual learning and that recognize the legitimacy of multiple forms of knowledge.
In this first example, P24 explains that a model that allows for the development of
relationships is necessary in order to establish trust and thus solve problems because "it
takes time" to understand "the different players."
One of the things that I think we learned, I say "we" because I was the
representative for the agency, is that it really takes one-on-one contact,
one-on-one discussions and deliberations to solve problems in a
community like the Upper Clark Fork community. It takes a lot of time to
first of all just to get to know the different players and the different
individuals in that community. What their interests and their needs are. It
takes quite a while to develop trust ...But I think probably the most
important thing we learned is that you can't really solve these problems
without first developing some sort of relationship with the people that
you're having to deal with (P24 Clark Fork 20, 27).
The next planner defines a process that he was involved with in the past that
emphasizes "getting to be a part of that community and build up some relationships" as
being a desirable method for future planning efforts.
What's worked best for us is when we've had some kind of guidance and
we're essentially sorting out how to do it and so forth, and we involve the
public on an informal manner ...it was a matter sitting down and having
coffee with people, and going to every meeting that they had in their
neighborhood associations and things like that, and going on hikes with
people, or canoe trips. Just essentially getting to be a part of that
community and build up some relationships and friendships with the
people there and do it that way. I think in retrospect that's probably what
an area like Glacier really needs ...I would say those kinds of almost
informal types of contacts work very well here. Where you have an open
house instead of a public meeting, and you go on an activity like a float
trip or something like that, and you might talk a little bit about some
planning issues or some resource issues. It's not a meeting where people
have got to take a number and stand up and talk into a microphone (PIO
Glacier 237, 250, 254).
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In the last example of a transactive planning process as a desired model. P26
explains that a method incorporating two-way dialogue would have allowed for "meat}-.
substantive-type" issues to be brought out and debated as well as being able to provide
information on agency mandates. Using this type of process would "bring the frustration
level down" and show that "we really do care about the local public."
It [two-way dialogue] gives the Fish and Wildlife Service an opportunity
to ask questions. If somebody comes in and is angry or upset, you can sort
of work with that person a little bit and bring the frustration level down a
little bit, and actually talk to that person. Ask questions ~ how do you feel
about this? What do think about that? What did you mean by that? ~ And
draw them out and actually get meaty, substantive-type concerns, issues,
whatever. And at the same time provide them information and provide
them with an idea that the Fish and Wildlife Service is not some
government agency sitting in some building cooking up an EIS, that we
really do care about the local public and want to build something that
works for them as well. I just think that's a much better way of doing
business (P26 Grizzly 155).

Description of Support for Working Propositions
The chi-square test statistic is based on a comparison of observed and expected
coimts. Since a fundamental assumption of the chi-square test was violated (more than
20 percent of the cells with expected counts less than five) for each of the tests of the
seven working propositions, the Kolmogorov-Smimov Z test was used. While the
Kolmogorov-Smimov Z test is not as powerful as other tests of significance (i.e. not as
good at finding differences when they exist in the population), the advantage is that this
test requires fewer assumptions regarding normality. The tests for Working Propositions
2 and 5 were significant and therefore tables are presented. Although many of the tests
were not significant, excerpts are nonetheless presented to exemplify insightful details
regarding the commencing statement of the working proposition.
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Working Proposition 1: Procedural Obligations
Working Proposition 1 states: A planner who perceives the planning environment
as impeded by procedural obligations is more likely to prefer models of planning other
than synoptic. An overwhelming majority of planners (92.9%) felt that the process of
planning

was constrained in some way by procedural obligations. The working

proposition was not supported since a significant association between the variables was
not found and thus offers no evidence to suggest that plarmers who feel constrained by
procedures are more likely to prefer models of planning other than synoptic. The first
two excerpts below illustrate pleinners who do not feel constrained by procedure. The
remainder of the excerpts in this section illustrate planners who do feel constrained by
procedure.
This first planner lauds the content analysis procedure performed after the release
of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement of the Grizzly process as one that was
effective and able to "reflect" public sentiment. Thus, the planner does not feel
constrained by procedural obligations and appears to have faith in the public comment
process as an appropriate method for deliberating about and dealing with issues.
...we took all of the issues. We spent over a week, the team did, going
through the analysis of public comments. Reading the comments, taking
the issues, and we listed them. We had flip charts of the issues. And then
we said, "Okay, how do you deal with this issue?" We brainstormed it,
came up with a way, it's in the Final [EIS]. It's reflected. So if a person is
going to look through the Final, they're going to say, "Hum, they dealt
with my issue." It's difficult to deal with all of them, but we dealt with
just as many as we could so that it will reflect how the public commented
on the draft (PI4 Grizzly 216).
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This next planner also appears not to feel constrained by procedures explaining
that the United States already has an "established public process" and that going "beyond
the process" may be "unhealthy."
You can be iimovative, but you also have to be in compliance with the
way the laws currently exist, not the way you want them to exist and are in
the process of changing laws. It's basically that you get both houses of
Congress to sign off on it, and the President signs it into law. Anything
less than that is not legal. So we have an established public process for the
way we make the laws, the way we amend laws, the way we rescind laws.
And then we have a court system that rules over it. We have separation of
powers and that's the process. Some people would like to go beyond the
process. And we don't think that's healthy. As imperfect as it may be ~
we have a democratic process ~ we have a system of government that's
well established for how we resolve disputes, how we make or amend or
rescind laws. We're comfortable with that system as it is. As I say
imperfect as it is, we're all subject to that same system. Whenever we try
and get around the system or go under it, that's unhealthy for the process
and we would not be supportive with any such efforts. So innovation yes,
but only if it's consistent with our established process (P27 Grizzly 243).
This next group of excerpts provides examples of planners who perceive the
planning environment as impeded by procedural obligations. Below, P7 explains that the
procedure prescribed by "the old traditional style" public meeting allows people to get
"up on their soapbox," and seems "inherently confrontational."
Clearly, the old traditional style of public meeting — seems like you see
less and less of that, with public officials up there in suits and ties on stage
and people have a chance at the mike, 10 or 15 minutes to blast their
opponents, blast public officials. It seems like in many cases there's little
value to that.
Q. Why don't you think that works?
A. I think it doesn't work because it mainly provides an opportunity for
people to get up on their soapbox and try to get their view across. There
doesn't appear to be a lot of opportunity for interchange ~ people really
trying to learn from other people's perspective ~ and it seems inherently
confrontational (P7 Blackfoot 464).
P12 explains that plarmers are constrained by NEPA and details the example from
one of the public meetings of the Grizzly process mandated by NEPA that turned violent.
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This planner notes that the procedure was not a "functional" process to elicit public
opinion because of a lack of dialogue.
The whole NEPA process is basically, you walk up to a hornets nest and
you hit it as many times as you can with a stick to get every last hornet
out, and the only people that come to public meetings are people that are
against what it is you're proposing to do. People that are in agreement
with what you're going to do, aren't going to go because they figure you're
going to do it anyway. ...We're constrained by NEPA. The law is very
restrictive as to what we can and caimot do by NEPA, and that's the
process. That's the vehicle that gets us down the road. We don't have
another vehicle. This wiiole idea that we don't have any way to get the
opinion of the average person out there, is a huge flaw in the system.
...The whole idea of having public meetings is a disaster. It should be
avoided at all costs. The idea where you get people to stand up at the front
of the room and say whatever it is they're going to say, even though it has
no relevance to reality. We [government officials] can't even respond and
say "well, that's not proposed," or "we're not trying to close all the roads."
You get 250 people in a high school auditorium in Salmon, Idaho, and you
get somebody up there that says "they [the government] are going to close
all the trails." We can't even say "no, we're not going to close all the
trails." And everybody there believes that that's the case, and they get
more excited. The next guy gets up and says "what he said." and then on
and on from there. Then you have people charging the stage and
threatening each other. Somebody gets up to say "I think grizzly bears are
okay" and somebody charges the stage and has to be tackled by the police
and dragged back. I mean, this isn't a functional way to do business in a
civilized society (P12 Grizzly 123, 232, 253 ).
This next excerpt describes a public hearing from the Grizzly process and
provides evidence that this procedure was intimidating for certain members of the public
who were coerced or interfered with. PI 8 speculates that certain members of the public
may not have commented because of this contentious setting.
A couple of the people that did speak for it [in favor of grizzly bear
recovery] that were from the local community kind of got booed-down
and there was some agitation from the public. The mayor had to actually
intercede and try to calm the locals down - he made a plea that "this is
America and we have free speech and we have to allow people the right to
say what they want to and it shouldn't be coerced or interfered with." But
still, it was very intimidating, and I'm sure there were people that wanted
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to say something there that maybe did not say or follow through with a
comment because of the way the crowd was acting (PI 8 Grizzly 77).
P8 describes the procedural obligations that certain federal agencies must perform
as overwhelming and producing "inactivity" and "gridlock."
...they [government plamiers] are trying so hard to follow the letter of the
law, that they just get swamped and overwhelmed. Some of the people
I've talked to in the BLM say, "it's terrible, but we're spending all our time
doing drafts, reviewing drafts, making sure that our public notices are
done at the right time and published correctly." They almost get to the
point of inactivity. It just gets gridlocked in this kind of endless loop of
worrying (PS Blackfoot 142).
The majority of plarmers in this study recounted problems with procedural
obligations. Most of these issues relate to problems with the NEPA process which is
intimidating for the public to participate in, suppresses two-way dialogue and can lead to
civil disobedience and even violence. The procedural obligations associated with NEPA
were described by one planner to be "inherently confrontational" where people do not
leam, but rather "get up on their soapbox." Issues also emerged relating to agency
personnel becoming "gridlocked" and worrying about following "the letter of the law."

Working Proposition 2: Scientism Inadequate
Working Proposition 2 states: A planner who perceives scientism as inadequate is
more likely to prefer models of planning other than synoptic. For this working
proposition, 71.4% of the planners surveyed felt that scientism, the belief that science is
inherently capable of solving almost all human problems, is inadequate when conducting
or participating in a planning process. Table 6 illustrates the significant association
between a planning model and planner's perception that scientism is inadequate. The first
three excerpts below illustrate planners who feel that scientism is adequate. The
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remainder of the excerpts in this section illustrate planners who feel that scientism is
inadeqiiate.
Table 6. Synoptic and transactive planners who feel scientism is inadequate.
Planners who feel
scientism is inadequate
Disagree %
Agree %
Planning
(n=5)
(n=20)
Model
80
0
Synoptic
0
60
Transactive
Undetermined
20
40
100
100
Total (%)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z = 1.732, p< .005
In this first excerpt illustrating a planner who feels that scientism is adequate, P12
explains his frustration in dealing with "rational resource decisions" that have become
politicized and based on emotion.
Whether we like it or not, people do make decisions based on emotion.
They don't make decisions based on fact. That leaves us in the difficult
position of trying to propose a complex issue and faced with a majority of
the public who doesn't read what it is we're proposing. ...It's nothing more
than making politics out of rational resource decisions. There's no sense
in that. ...I can't express to you enough the frustration that I have dealing
with politicians. ...All they're interested in doing is manipulating the
system to get themselves votes. They're not interested in the big picture
and the good of the country, or in any kind of environmental issue in any
way. The politicians we have will strive at every length to prevent
environmental progress. And they're very effective at it (PI2 Grizzly 151,
278, 320).
P27 explains that the preferred alternative in the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement is politically-based instead of being based on "what's best for the bear."
I don't think they [USFWS] have probably the best available science in
this case. I think they've developed a preferred alternative that's based
more on political considerations, £ind for political expedience rather than
what's best for the bear. And some of the endorsements of the preferred
alternative, even state things to that effect ~ has referred to the
conservation biology alternative as the best biological alternative or based
on the most scientific information for bears . The preferred alternative ~ I
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think it's something that's based more on the politics of the matter than
science in my view, and that's pretty clear {P27 Grizzly 135).
In the last example of a planner who feels that scientism is adequate, P6 explains
that science is necessary to "get this thing sold socially and politically" and criticizes the
DFWP in that they may be more inclined to follow public opinion than the authority of
science that will "tell us we're right, or it may tell us we're wrong."
Well, I think the motivation for the process is more an emotional
perceptive, seat of the pants kind of thing. The science has got to be there
to support your off-the-cuff feelings or to not support them. I think that's
what's really critical. Some people think the river is overcrowded and is
having an impact of a negative sort on water quality, fisheries, wildlife
habitat, and the science has got to come in and tell us if that's so or it's not
so, or as is probably the case, it's a mixed bag. We're not going to get this
thing sold socially and politically unless we've got science to back up
whatever we come up with. And the science may tell us we're right, or it
may tell us we're wrong, or as I suspect, you're right in some places and
wrong in others and completely screwed up in some other area. But I
think that's really critical. I think when we start talking numbers and the
possibility, the possibility of controlling numbers, limiting the numbers of
people, whether they be commercial users or the general public, we're not
going to get that sold unless we can show that there is a definite problem
being created, and the only way to do that, to show that, is for science to
come in and take a real hard look at some of these areas. ...And I'm a little
concerned that the Department [DFWP] may be guided more by what
people think and what people want and sort of follow that instead of
maybe taking the lead and saying, "okay, maybe folks don't see there's a
problem here, but our scientists say, our biologists say, or surveyors say,
there is a problem." We need to respond to that so we're going to have to
go out and convince the public by showing them that data, the surveys,
studies, those conclusions and trying to get them to respond to that (P6
Blackfoot 172, 247).
The next group of excerpts illustrate planners who feel that scientism is
inadequate. In this first example, PI8 admits that the federal and state planning officials
working toward grizzly bear recovery do not "have all the answers" and should not be so
guarded on information they hold.
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We certainly don't have all the answers, and we need to submit we don't
have all the answers. We had some pretty good information in the
Bitterroot about the quality of the habitat there. ...We need to say that we
just don't know the answers on all this stuff and not pretend that we do,
and not be so guarded on a lot of the information we have (PI 8 Grizzly
216, 227).
P25 elaborates on how science should be used and that often, science tells us the
"whats" but not the "shoulds." P25 recognizes that ultimately, decisions are based on
values and that science should only help to make those decisions.
It's in the nature of scientific inquiry that the last chapter never is written
because all the original chapters are in constant revision. As long as
science has integrity and remains the thing we call science, that will
always be so. ...I'm a person who quibbles with the sort of nothing-butscience aptitude and attitude of many people in the envirorunental
commimity. I don't think that scientific information tells us what to do. 1
think it's extremely rare when science is normative, when it dictates the
"shoulds." It tells us the "whats" — it tells us the likelihood of certain
changes of things we might set in motion. It can be a great tool for
beginning to predict outcomes that might come with certain kinds of
changes and on and on, but I don't think science of itself is normative, nor
should it be. The normative has to come from somewhere else. We have
to make decisions based on values, based on the way we've constituted
centers of power aind responsibility in society, and we have to be
courageous about those decisions and willing to live with the
consequences of the decisions. Of course, scientific information can help
us and it should, but to say somehow that we can only do things that are
within the realm of "what the science says" I think is a complete
misapprehension of the nature of scientific information (P25 Clark Fork
319,338).
P22 explains that often, natural resource controversies do not involve "black and
white" solutions and thus science can inform but not provide answers in value-laden
conflicts.
What tends to happen is, that people whose values are being supported by
the science, tend to want a scientific solution. The people that don't,
whose values are not being supported apparently by the scientific
community, don't want a scientific answer. They say "this is not science."
The science in my experience doesn't give you answers in value-laden
situations. I think the basic currency of politics is values, and what
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politicians are good at is figuring out how to deal with value conflicts.
Science doesn't do that, it's not good at it, it doesn't have any expertise at
it, but it can help inform people about what their choices are. That's the
role that I think science has to play. Most controversies involving natural
resources do not have black and white solutions. This is not the case of
arguing about whether two plus two equals four (P22 Clark Fork 300).
This last excerpt provides evidence of a planner who feels scientism is inadequate
by explaining the notion that planning occurs in a political world without "black and
white" answers.
All national parks are, are values and one value against another value.
Values of natural and wilderness versus values of historic and national
landmark. And, unfortimately, the Park Service mission says, "to
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects therein." It
doesn't say, "and the historic objects in historic parks, but not in big
western national parks." ...management of public entities is politics. ...we
are not in a society in which you turn around and have some scientist say
in a black and white world, "here is the answer that's black. What you
want to do is white and it doesn't fit this black, so therefore, you're wrong
and we can only do it this way." We're in a political world. ...Research
will never come up and tell you that one way is right and one way is
wrong. It ends up becoming a public policy issue, and public policy issues
are dealt with by the public, not by scientists. You can't have agency staff
that says "we're right, you're wrong" (PI 1 Glacier 260, 280, 360, 368).
Nearly three-quarters of the planners in this study felt that scientism is an
inadequate paradigm from which to base natural resource planning. Further, the test of
significance provides evidence that a synoptic planner is more likely to espouse scientism
than a transactive planner. Synoptic planners who felt that scientism is adequate related
narratives on the frustrations of basing decisions on emotion and political expedience and
using science to convince the public. In contrast, transactive planners who felt that
scientism is inadequate related narratives recognizing the need to base decisions on
values and that while working in a political world, solutions will not be presented as
"black and white" (P22 and PI 1) answers.
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Working Proposition 3: Planning Environment Inflexible
Working Proposition 3 states: A planner who perceives the planning environment
as inflexible is more likely to prefer models of plarming other than synoptic. No statistic
could be generated because all of the planners perceived the planning environment to be
inflexible to varying degrees. Various examples of the extent to which planners feel the
planning environment is inflexible are presented below.
This first excerpt provides an example of a planner who perceives the planning
environment to be inflexible because of the organizational structure. PI 6 notes that the
problem regarding innovation is not financial but rather is engrained in the organization
in that there are too many "layers" and inappropriate allocation of funds.
There has not been a constraint I think financially at all. I think they've
[USFWS] had more than ~ whatever. I'm not sure the agency has ever
had a limit in terms of people or funding. I think its had an inability to
change and apply the fluids where it should be. I'm not sure that limited
funds or people would really be the issue. It seems like there's a message
there that maybe we have too many layers in the organization, maybe too
many people in some layers and there should be more money to co-op
with industry, conservation groups, consultants, whoever, to assist with
this kind of work. But I'm not sure that the limits per se, in terms of
people or money, are there. I think the limits are pretty much engrained
into the organization itself (PI 6 Grizzly 259).
PI 7 of the Grizzly process explains that NEPA is expensive because it "bums up
the resources," and fails to build consensus while a more collaborative approach may
prove to be less expensive in the long run.
Resources [time and money] are definitely an issue, but part of it is, we
bum up so much, so many resources. Polarization is what bums up the
resources, where agencies go through these lengthy processes of trying to
make a decision and to the extent things don't get resolved, they've spent
all their money doing the NEPA process and then haven't really buih any
consensus for where they can make a decision that sticks. Somebody goes
to the courts and may find a way to overtum that decision or the agency
gets held up, and meanwhile expends more resources defending itself I
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mean, people think-collaboration is expensive, but when you look at the
long-term and what you can avoid when you are able to knit together
broader constituencies in terms of the staying power of the decisions, it
doesn't look so expensive after all. ...Agencies are really strapped for
funds to move these things forward and I just think they need to recognize
that for big restoration programs like this, it takes some commitment of
funds on the front end to meet and greet and explain to people your
programming and get past the sloganeering end of it to the specifics (P17
Grizzly 127, 262).
P28 feels that personal resources are inadequate in that the "human dimensions
expertise" is lacking within federal agencies.
I think all of those, time, money is always an issue ~ and personnel. I
really think that we're lacking in human dimensions expertise, and the
ability to moderate large public meetings. People tend to be pretty poorly
trained, and we tend not to use those moderators very effectively or very
often (P28 Grizzly 150).
In the next excerpt, P20 explains that a collaborative process, such as the Clark
Fork process, tends to come up with better solutions but are "expensive in time."
When an agency looks at its budget, I think these processes [collaborative]
actually are cheaper in terms of hard cash, often. They come up with
better solutions, but they're expensive in time. They're expensive in a lot
of time, and if you're not serious about getting into it, and you're not
serious about giving up a certain level of control and participating, and if
the land owners aren't serious, it isn't going to happen, because it's a huge
time commitment. The Upper Clark Fork Steering Committee worked for
five years to get from the concept to a plan. That's a lot of meetings (P20
Clark Fork 232).
P21 explains that time was necessary in the Clark Fork process in order to share
information, perspectives and interests, and allow for attitudes and positions to change
and eventually build trust.
I did see a lot of this posturing and suspicion and a lot of these folks all sat
together on one side of the table early on. And at breaks they would go in
the comer and huddle and talk to each other and probably try to present
unified positions on certain issues and things like that. And over time —
and it took time and 1 think this is one of the big lessons that we learned, is
that if you're really going to strive for consensus solutions and
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understanding, you have to be able to accommodate the time factor. And
it really does take time. I bet it was a year and a half and we started out by
saying, "okay, let's share information, let's get some background here.
Let's try to define the problems that we're dealing with. Let's try to share
perspectives on these problems. Let's try to understand each other's
position and interest in coming to the table here." It probably took a year
and a half and there were heated arguments, there was kind of some
mudslinging going on. ...But certainly when you're dealing with something
as complex as watershed management, you know, in a large geographic
area, that's got many different land ownerships, many different land uses.
many inter-related issues, you need that time. We saw attitudes change.
Positions change over time ~ just as they had a chance to ponder this and
to evaluate different alternatives and things like that. It's hard for me to
imagine that that would have been possible if it was condensed into a short
time period. I don't know how that would be possible. And I think it pays
off in the long run. I think you do a much better job of getting the word
out, building the trust. I think that we had an improved credibility over
time (P21 Clark Fork 86,125).
A fioistrating issue, according to P5, is that time and money limits must be
predicted early in the process and do not allow for "a process of discovery."
I think where we get particularly fhistrated with money and time
constraints is that we are expected to predict the time limit and the money
limit so early in the process. One of our guys describes planning as a
process of discovery, and you really don't understand what you're doing in
a plan until you're well, well into it. We would probably all be happier if
we could do a time and cost estimate at the begirming of the plan and then
really be free to re-evaluate that six months into the plan. The fact is, we
don't have that freedom. That's probably where those limits get fhistrating
(P5 Glacier 404).
According to P9 of the Glacier process, planning must allow for mistakes while
recognizing that planning is not "an exact science" and thus must accommodate the
individuality of each National Park.
You have to allow for things not to work, and you have to be willing to
come up with some other ways to maybe accomplish things. And I think
in the beginning we tried to stick very much to, "they did it like this in
Arches, this is the way we're going to do it in Glacier." And for those of
us who were less familiar with VERP, it was an easy track to fall into.
...You know, because it was a new process, because it had never applied to
the GMP, you had to allow for mistakes. And yet this project was also
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being touted as, "we're going to get this GMP done for less than a million
dollars and we're going to do it in less than three years." You can't throw
all that together. You can't allow for mistakes to happen and say, "we're
going to do this really fast and cheap." ...I think in the end, planning, like I
said, it's not an exact science. It doesn't have a process that you follow
without deviating. You don't follow the same process, the same steps, at
every planning -- at every project. What works for Glacier probably won't
work for Yellowstone and whatever works at Yellowstone is not going to
work for Pipestone National Monument. Every planning effort at a
National Park has to be individualized, and part of that is based on people
and the publics and the resource and all of that. Everybody wants a
cookbook. Everybody wants something that can be done quickly and
cheaply, and by its very nature planning is neither quick nor inexpensive
(P9 Glacier 58, 74,417).
This last excerpt provides evidence that a lack of time and money "burned some
people out" because of prior expectations that the planning process would be "fairly
straightforward."
For the General Management Plan, we were thinking a real small amount
of money to start vdth and it wound up being a lot more, a lot more time, a
lot more staff involved. Just a lot more of everything. But I think we
really burned some people out doing it, myself probably one of them. I
think we had an expectation this was going to be fairly straightforward and
easy to start with and it was anything but that (PIO Glacier 267).
Planners explained to varying degrees the frustrations of operating in an
environment that was inflexible. This inflexibility resulted from the inappropriate
allocation of funds within the organization and a lack of human dimensions expertise.
Many planners explained that planning simply takes time. One plarmer explained that
planning is a "process of discovery" and that every plan must be individualized and allow
for things not to work. Several planners explained that a more collaborative approach,
while more time consuming, can actually be less expensive in the long-term, can lead to
trust-building and lead to better outcomes.
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Working Proposition 4: Innovation Rewarded
Working Proposition 4 states; A planner who perceives the planning environment
as one that rewards iimovation is more likely to prefer models of planning other than
synoptic. A test statistic was not able to be generated for this working proposition
because the proposition proved problematic for several reasons. First, certain individuals
were not involved in an institutional setting (i.e. members of the public, members of
NGO's, ranchers or other landowners) in which reward for actions taken was a significant
issue. Second, in many cases with the remaining planners, it was not possible to
determine whether they perceived the planning environment as one that rewards
innovation because of ambiguous or unclear statements. Thus, with a small sample size,
the statistical test was not performed. However, results from several of the planners are
presented below in order to illustrate the range and diversity of opinion regarding the
reward structure of various organizations.
In this first excerpt, P26 describes the organizational structure of the Forest
Service as oppressive and that there is not only no reward structure but that employees
are chastised for stepping outside the way business is done.
The Forest Service was a whole different ballgame. The Forest Service
blew my mind, that's why I left. It was a paramilitary-type organization
and people who stepped outside of the way business was done and had
been done for years and years and years were chastised. It wasn't a good
deal. I was not rewarded in that agency for being somebody that tried to
be innovative and visionary.
Q- How did that affect the way you went about business when you were
there?
A. It was horrible. It was oppressive. I came into the Forest Service with
all kinds of brilliant ideas about ways to change things and do things
better, integrate new science, and I lasted [number] years. My last year
there, my productivity was zip, my morale was zip. It was pretty
demoralizing (P26 Grizzly 224).
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P6 of the Blackfoot process explains that he has participated on committees where
members are thanked but then all of the hard work is "stuck in a drawer."
I've been on a few of those kinds of committees [similar to the
RecSteerCom] where you work like the dickens and put a tremendous
amount of time and effort into it and then you get thmiked and it gets stuck
in a drawer and that's the end of it (P6 Blackfoot 369).
P5 jokingly reports that there is no reward structure in the NPS for him and that
satisfaction comes from knowing that the mission of the Park Service has moved forward.
...there's no reward [laughs]. Our rewards are internal and the fact that we
have moved the parks forward. I think in the agency, you are rewarded if
you don't make anybody uncomfortable. Making people uncomfortable is
something that we do in planning a lot, and so I think our rewards have to
come from first of all, surviving a meeting (P5 Glacier 357).
P15 unenthusiastically laments that occasionally, employees are "tapped on the
shoulder and presented a plaque" suggesting a more cursory approach to rewarding
innovation.
I guess you get a sense of that [being rewarded] by comments people
make to you, like after that meeting, maybe your supervisor coming up
and saying, "jeez, I think that was a good meeting, I think we got some
good information." I guess in my mind, I take that as, "we were successful
tonight." So I guess I kind of see it as a team sort of thing. Our agency
does have award recognition sort of stuff that occurs periodically and there
are individuals that get kind of tapped on the shoulder and presented a
plaque saying, "here, you did a really great job" and all that business. I
guess there's things in place (PI5 Blackfoot 285).
Most of the planners in this study who commented on the reward structure of their
respective organizations suggested that employees are presented with only cursory
acclamation for their work within the agency or for trying innovative approaches to
planning.
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Working Proposition 5: Public Participation Encouraged
Working Proposition 5 states: A planner who feels that public participation should
be encouraged is more likely to prefer models of planning other than synoptic. Planners
were evenly split (50%) into categories of feeling that public participation should or
should not be encouraged. Table 7 illustrates the significant association between the
variables and provides evidence that a planner who feels that public participation should
be encouraged is more likely to prefer models of planning other than synoptic.
Table 7. Synoptic and transactive planners who feel that public participation should
be encouraged.
Planners who feel that
public participation
should be encouraged
Disagree %
Planning
Agree %
(n=14)
(n=14)
Model
Synoptic
0
35.7
Transactive
100
0
Undetermined
0
64.3
Total (%)
100
100
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z =1.9' 9, p< .001
The first three excerpts in this section provide examples of planners who feel that
the public should not be encouraged. The remainder of the excerpts in this section are
examples of plarmers who feel public participation should be encouraged.
In this first example of a planner who feels public participation should not be
encouraged, P2 doesn't believe there was "anything wrong with our attempts to involve
the public" even though the process was mired in contention. The planner feels that a
process that allows for intermittent participation by the public is adequate when planning.
In addition, P2 notes the public is "fickle" and information provided to the public must be
"simple."
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Dealing with the public, as you probably know, they're very fickle. They
don't understand the issues that we do. Some may, but the majority don't.
They deal with sound bites. ...We had focus groups. We had scoping
meetings. We had public meetings on the Draft EIS. We had received
comments from the public all throughout and the newsletters went out. So
I don't think there was anything wrong with our attempts to involve the
public, and even our attempts to listen to the public. ...I think when you
ask the public to react to something, you better make it simple. Not overly
simple, but it better be something ~ it better be important, it better be
simple (P2 Glacier 104, 235, 389).
In this next example of a planner who feels public participation should not be
encouraged, PI 6 sees the role of the public as identifying what they expect from the land,
but not providing "information." The public comments would then be "weighed" by the
decision maker.
So I'm not sure that they [the public] would bring information. Rather,
identifying what do they expect out of land they own is how I would really
see their role. Obviously, whoever the decision maker is in each situation,
is going to have to weigh that against the requirements of the Endangered
Species Act, Clean Water [Act], Clean Air [Act], and the Forest Service's
own regulations. So I look at it more as not bringing information to the
table, unless it's just their own collective personal history and views,
which I guess would be information, but I think it's [public participation]
more of an opportunity to guide, suggest, formulate, and not so much
bring information (PI6 Grizzly 184).
The last example of a planner who feels public participation should not be
encouraged, P27 states that the public "fulfilled its role" by simply commenting on the
Draft EIS. The perception of the role of the public to only critique documents instead of
being intimately involved throughout the process is an indication that the planner does
not espouse a public participation process based on social learning.
I think the public needs to comment, and their comments need to be fully
assessed. The agency [USFWS] needs to explain how they incorporated
public comment and public input into their decision-making process, so
the public role is -- the public fulfilled its role (P27 Grizzly 155).
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This next set of excerpts provides examples of planners who feel public
participation should be encouraged. P4 believes the public should participate at the
beginning to set goals and objectives.
Well, the obvious answer of public participation is to start at the very
beginning. Bringing them [the public] in at the beginning. We're trying to
do it with a survey questionnaire. We're trying to do it through an
advisory committee, the RecSteerCom. ...I think it's obvious, if you didn't
bring them in at the beginning and you've waited imtil the end, that would
make it [planning process] even longer. So you bring them in at the
beginning and set your goals and purposes right at the beginning, and
objectives, which I'm not sure we've done yet (P4 Blackfoot 101, 152).
PI9 explains that public participation must begin before the project is designed
and thus creates "ownership" and an informal setting where people are not "ostracized"
for speaking.
I think when you really need the interaction and the public involvement is
before the project is even really designed. If you want meaningful input
into it, it seems a little late when you've already got a proposed alternative,
and then you're taking it out there and basically asking for their blessing.
That doesn't work. I mean, if you have people involved in the design of
something, they have some ownership in it, then you can design your
NEPA process to accommodate that. The way it works now, it's not that
meaningful to me. The other thing is, you can sit down — it's not as formal
a process, you're not ostracized for standing up in front of a microphone
by some other group. But, you can have a group come together, sit down
and discuss it. ...That takes time up front, a lot of time, but I still think in
the long run it leads to a lot better decisions (PI9 Clark Fork 257, 275).
P22 believes that a "safe" environment where self-interests can be exposed is
most appropriate to encourage public participation. He explains that Northern Lights
Institute was a neutral entity and provided this safe forum where people could get to
know each other. Further, P22 states that this safe environment implies the group should
have no legal authority and where compromise does not involve giving up something you
care about.
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Northern Lights had no clear objective. It had truly behaved in a neutral
manner. And the experience of writing the report about the "State of the
Clark Fork" gave some of these people — well, first of all, they got to
know each other a little bit. And it gave them some experience in the
ability to work together and their ability to do that. ...Basically - I don't
know where I learned this ~ but this process has helped to affirm in me
the belief that the key to developing agreements, issues of natural
resource, and public policy, is self-interest. If you can get people to focus
on what their interests are and create a situation that's safe enough for
them to expose what their self-interests are, you can begin to look at all
these interests and see if they fit together in any way. This is not about
compromise. Compromise implies giving up something you care about.
That's not what happens. It isn't compromise. People don't give up what
they care about. TTiey might be tricked into it for a little while, but then
they resent it afterwards when they try to find out how to get back what
they really care about. So, in the case of this, agriculture finally figured
out their core interest was protecting water which they already had,
because in fact, there wasn't a lot of extra water to get anyway, and they
knew that. And Fish, Wildlife and Parks had the same — their core interest
was, they didn't want the situation to get any worse and they wanted a way
to participate in water-related management activities. So NLI created a
way for them to do that as well. And I started talking with you before
about the initial climate that existed when the water leasing statute was
passed. It was very difficult for anybody in agriculture to do business with
Fish, Wildlife and Parks because they were viewed as a traitor. One of the
things that NLI affected is that environment. ...If you enter a room and the
people in the room have the ability to decide something that affects you,
and it looks like your interest is under represented, in other words, the bad
guys can "out vote" you and they can make something happen, that's not
safe. So these processes work best when the group that's formed has no
legal authority. The only legal authority that we have really wasn't
authority, it was a mandate. We had to produce that plan. But nobody had
to pay attention to it, legislature didn't have to do anything, it was all
voluntary. My experience is, you don't want the group to have any legal
authority, because if there's legal authority it's not safe because that
authority gets used against you. You also want a decision rule that doesn't
allow interests to gang up on each other. What I think works is a form of
consensus, a decision rule in which anyone at the table, anyone of the
interests can veto the outcome. But they have a responsibility that goes
along with that, that if they want to exercise their veto, they have to
explain why they do and make a suggestion as to what would help resolve
their problem. ...The rule that I use about who should be there is, who has
the ability to block implementation of any agreement that you reach. If
there are people like that, then you want them there (P22 Clark Fork 158,
208, 265, 365).
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P25 articulates that litigation erodes certain positive social qualities and that a
collaborative process such as the Clark Fork process was able to solve short-term
enviromnental problems and promote long-term social capital.
I think contested case proceedings again, in their nature, are rarely
constructive as matters of social construction, of building a sense of
forward movement and aptitude in society to come up with things
collectively or come up with plans, policies, ideas, strategies for
implementation. I think that contested case proceedings, litigation, even
the water reservation proceeding, tends to be erosive of certain social
qualities. My guess is, and I never talked to any people in the agency
about this, either of the agencies. Natural Resources or Fish and Game, but
I'm going to have to guess that there was a recognition on the part of those
people through the Clark Fork project, that it's possible to do two things at
once. That you can in fact build social capital while you try to address,
constructively address, environmental policy. In other words, you don't
have to be tearing apart social capital or social capacity while you're
moving towards some environmental good. I myself would take that one
step further and say probably as a long-term proposition, you're not going
to do the envirorunent any good by tearing up social capital. It's possible
to have a series of short-term gains, win the battles and lose the war, if you
will. I think the Clark Fork project opened the possibility that you can
gain in two places simultaneously (P25 Clark Fork 62).
In this last example of a plarmer who feels public participation should be
encouraged, P20 elaborates on the elements that make for successfiil plarming that
include building dialogue in which stakeholders become part of the process.
You meet the requirements of the law, you hold a dialogue, you
incorporate the public in it, but you never do in a meaningful way where
they're actually part of the process. When I was in school, we learned you
had these public involvement stages that came at critical key points.
Comment, inteiject, feedback. There was always this flow chart, but the
public was never in control of it. The public theoretically came in, their
time was valuable, they take a look at what you did and critique it, and
then you honestly took that critique and went and made changes. You do
your best under that situation, but the elements that make that plan
successfiil and make that plan part of the other stakeholders who are going
to be affected by it aren't there. ...You've got to build that dialogue in so
they [stakeholders] become, in my mind, they become part of the process.
You just have to be much more open to giving those folks access to the
table as you move forward (P20 Grizzly 287, 304).
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The test of significance for this working proposition provides evidence that a
synoptic planner is more likely to prefer models of planning that do not encourage public
participation. One of the synoptic planners who felt that public participation should not
be encouraged explains that the public is "fickle" so the information presented should be
"simple." Other synoptic plarmers felt the role of the public should be limited to
"suggesting" information or merely "commenting" on the process.
Transactive planners who felt that public participation should be encouraged
explained that the public should participate at the beginning of a process in order to set
goals and objectives and create ownership in the process. One transactive planner
explained that in order for the public to make self-interests explicit, a "safe" environment
was a necessity to developing agreements. Another transactive plaimer explained that by
encouraging public participation, both social capital and environmental policy can be
promoted.

Working Proposition 6: Goals are Contested
Working Proposition 6 states: A planner who recognizes that goals are contested
is more likely to prefer models of planning other than synoptic. No statistic could be
generated because all of the planners perceived that goals were contested within the
natural resource setting in which they were working. However, as with Working
Proposition 3, elements of this working proposition contain rich text and diversity of
opinion and thus examples are provided below. In this first example, P2 explains that
perceptions of how Glacier National Park should be managed differed among the
planning team and thus planners had difficulty working as team members.
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I think there's some very different feelings about how the Park should be
managed. There's people in this Park that think it should all be wilderness.
There's other people in this Park that think we should be developing hotels
and putting in new roads, upgrading existing facilities, adding rooms.
adding wings to hotels, hardening trails, scaling back on wilderness. But
the Park Service, one of the things that opened my eyes, it's not a
tremendously green organization. So there was a lot of dissension
amongst the [planning] team - a lot of very different feelings amongst the
team. Whenever you get into, and I fall into this category, whenever you
get into a team situation, you want to make sure that your point is
recognized and represented and people fight very strongly for that. It's
difficult to take your hat off and say, "now I'm a team member. While I'm
an individual and I have strong personal beliefs, on the team I look at
what's best for the Park, not necessarily what I think is best." That's
difficult for people to do (P2 Glacier 178).
In this next example, P25 explains that with the Clark Fork process, members of
the Steering Committee recognized that certain goals could not be altered and had to
remain secure and thus, members devised ways that would not negotiate away goals and
avoid "goal protecting behavior."
We had to build into discussion explicit references, explicit mechanisms to
recognize that certain goals simply couldn't be overcome. One of the
principal goals of the agricultural interests in the Upper Clark Fork Basin,
was to protect their water rights. That's one of the oldest, most
trustworthy goals among Westerners. Protect your water rights. People in
the project had to have assurances that this was not a project that attacked
water rights, that eroded them, and took them away. ...I think the public
agency people. Fish, Wildlife and Parks in particular, had a goal that was
maybe not held with exactly similar force, but it was certainly central to
their ends and that goal had to be recognized, and that was that they took
very seriously their legal mandate to manage the fisheries of the Upper
Clark Fork Basin, and to try to manage them well. They were in it for
keeps and there were certain things that they just simply were not willing
to negotiate away or trade away or set on the table for negotiation, because
they thought their mandate had to remain secure. Again, I think people at
the table had to recognize that those goals were in place and that they were
honorable and that they meant something. Those are just a couple of
examples about what I would say is the goal protecting behavior that goes
on. I think in most collaborative groups and it's one of the things that
comes up time and again, people will say, "well, all the collaborative
group is trying to do is bring a bunch of people together to compromise.
They have to give something in order to gain something. So you have to
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compromise away and we're not willing to do that. Our goals are
fundamental, either based on values - my constituency holds the same
values, we're not here to negotiate them away." Well, I think what we
learned in the project and other projects is, that you can maintain very
certain and definite goals, not negotiate those away, not make those open
to negotiation, because there's a lot of room, there are plenty of other
things to negotiate (P25 Clark Fork 107, 116).
P24 recognized that litigation was the probable course of action had the
Committee not formed and because of the possible expense of court hearings, the
collaborative effort of the Steering Committee was a better route to go.
I think what they [Upper Clark Fork Steering Committee] learned was that
it was probably going to be better for everybody to go about it this way
rather than the other way, which almost undoubtedly would have ended up
in court. ...But I think it was just that the outcome was so uncertain when
you go down the path of litigation, that I just think everybody felt it was
going to be so expensive, number one, and I don't think the irrigators were
all that interested in having to raise the money to do it, and I don't think
the Department was either. And the outcome is so uncertain in those
situations that they felt that maybe this, as an experiment, would be a
better route to go (P24 Clark Fork 47, 149).
Since factions were polarized, P19 states that a unilateral decision-making process
would have exacerbated the polarization and adds, in order to avoid having one group
"torpedo" the project, the type of process that stakeholders in the Clark Fork basin
initiated was more appropriate.
...there, you've got a polarized faction that are going to do everything
possible to torpedo the project. And if you do not have all the parties
together, full understanding, informed decision-making at least, granted
you're still going to have opposition, but it's not going to be the kind that's
out there to destroy you. I think that's one example right there of why we
should be looking more at these consensus groups, and utilizing that
method over just a unilateral decision (PI 9 Clark Fork 57).
In this last example, P20 explains that because the goals of various stakeholders
were different, if litigation had been the chosen course of action, shared learning and
dialogue would have never taken place.
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...it would have been handled by attorneys and concepts and framed in
legal work, and in my mind, you'd probably never get into real dialogue of
how people work and live on the land or their needs. It would be an
expert opinion here and an expert opinion there and a decree here. So you
don't have a dialogue. As a consequence none of the issues of what really
happens on the ground or the concerns or the commonalities of concerns,
never come forward. So this type of process, the fact that these people see
each other every day, they're able to sort of do shared learning (P20 Clark
Fork 88).
All of the planners in this study recognized that to some degree, goals were either
not identified or not agreed upon by various stakeholders. One planner explained how
difficult being a team member was in a situation where goals were contested. Several
planners with the Clark Fork process explained that the collaborative process showed that
stakeholders could maintain goals and not negotiate them away, that opposing groups
could fiinction and not "torpedo" the project and that shared learning could take place
even though stakeholders held differing goals.

Working Proposition 7: Systemic-level Problems
Working Proposition 7 states: A planner who perceives problems as existing on a
systemic level is more likely to prefer models of planning other than synoptic. The
majority of planners (92.9%) feel that problems exist on a systemic level. The
Kolmogorov-Smimov Z test was not significant and thus, there is no evidence to suggest
that plarmers who feel that problems exist on a systemic level are more likely to prefer
models of planning other than synoptic. Examples are provided below of both planners
who feel that problems exist on a systemic level and the one planner who does not.
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This first and only example of a planner who does not perceive problems to exist
on a systemic level explains that the delays with the Final EIS are not a result of
systemic-level problems, but rather because planners "have a lot on their agenda."
Q. What frustrations have you had working internally within the agency?
A. Going through the process of review, making the necessary changes, and
dealing with the folks in the Director's office, who essentially, you know.
they have a lot on their agenda. Their plates are full and this is not a
priority as I would like to see it be. So from that aspect, with these delays I
think we really look like we're bumbling bureaucrats that are unable to get a
job accomplished, when in reality I think the team, the EIS team and the
other members have worked very hard. We've done our work, but it's
outside of our hands (PI4 Grizzly 17).
The following examples provide evidence of plaimers who feel that problems
exist on a systemic level. P12 explains that in the smaller communities surrounding the
grizzly bear recovery area, there exists xenophobia which has undermined a sense of
trust.
But what they're [residents of communities near the recovery area] seeing
now is that the things that they thought were beneficial, things like
exploitive timber harvest, are not happening any more, and the things that
are now happening [grizzly bear recovery] are things that they can't see as
beneficial at all. It's like wolf reintroduction and grizzly bear
reintroduction. It's to them being fostered by somebody who's not a
community member, and there's this xenophobia about anybody that's not
from Salmon and not from Challis, or not from Darby or Hamilton, is not
to be trusted. And they think we [local residents] should be making these
decisions on what happens around our community. There's a huge issue
there, and when we talk to these communities, we represent the federal
government, which to them is people from Maryland and Virginia who
have never seen a grizzly bear and never been to Idaho or Montana. And
they feel this is being inflicted on them and they've forgotten the issue,
that these are public lands, they're national forest lands. Many of these
people look at these lands as their personal lands (PI2 Grizzly 187).
P6 states that the public is not interested in problems until they become a "crisis"
and explains that the public needs to become actively involved in natural resource issues.
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The general public is usually not aware of or too interested in these things
until there's a crisis of some sort and many times the crisis for them comes
when you start talking about and publicizing management plans,
regulations, controls, limitations, and then people get excited and usually
that's what it takes. ...For the general public, I think it takes a crisis, either
in an individual or in general before they begin to really respond to these
things. ...I think most people are very busy, are very preoccupied with
their own personal problems, but I think here in this state and probably
many places, they take these things for granted, and it's a terrible shock to
them when all of a sudden, for whatever reason, the opportunities that
were there for them are no longer there, or are threatened. And then the
tomatoes hit the fan, big time. And they're going to blame somebody,
they're going to nail somebody for it, when it's really their own damn fault
because if it was that important to them to start with, they should be
interested enough to focus on it and leam about it and maybe disagree
violently about what the situation is or how to resolve it, the problem. But
they should be actively involved (P6 Blackfoot 77,134, 273).
This next planner explains that the public does not have time because of all of the
problems in their daily lives and thus the political landscape is controlled by special
interests.
You know, I don't think the public has the time, quite frankly. We're one
agency. But, they [the public] are dealing with the county commission,
they're dealing with city government, they're dealing with the Forest
Service, they're dealing with the Corps of Engineers, Bonneville Power,
the Bureau of Rec, plus they've got their daily lives and problems with
their jobs and kids and everything. I don't think that you can spoon feed
the public anymore than we have. 1 really don't. I think to some degree
they've got to come to us when they've got a question, and they've got to
interact with us civilly. ...They don't have time to understand the depth of
what we're trying to do. 1 think that's a very important concept. People
just ~ the majority - don't have time. That's why Washington is run by
special interests. That's why Congressman and Senators get lobbied by
very narrowly defined special interests. ...One of the things you've got to
understand is, the public has limited time. They're going to deal with
sound bites (P2 Glacier 350, 379, 583).
P26 feels that the culture within the agency tends to be run by "control freaks"
and the people who question that authority are "chastised."
1 think it's institutionalized. From what I saw in the [National Forest
name], it's sort of culture. I mean it's a culture within the agency, and it is
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pretty much widespread and institutionalized. I look at the Regional
Office. I was there for a while. And it's the same thing. Same thing. A
bunch of folks that are control freaks and very happy to do the
paramilitary thing and people that step out of line are chastised and not
rewarded, and eventually pushed out of the system. But there are pockets
out there that were creative folks at districts and forest levels that try to do
things differently. If they're lucky enough to have a Forest Supervisor
that's a little more liberal and forward-thinking then you're allowed to do
good things (P26 Grizzly 251).
Problems are systemic in nature because, according to PI6, information does not
come from the direct supervisors and decision-makers do not match scale with issues and
information.
Q. What do you mean that limits are engrained in the organization?
A. You have a Chief and then a Deputy Chief, and Regional Forester and
so on. Very few people get their information from the person they work
for. I mean, we live in a very fluid world in terms of information.
Secondarily, you often, for example with the Interior Columbia River
basin, will take an immense amovmt of information and try and use that to
make decisions at a scale which they should not be making decisions at.
It's a very broad basin ...Again, I'll use the Columbia River Basin as an
example. You have four or five Regional Foresters, a couple of State
Directors, debating whether a buffer along a stream should be 295 feet or
300 feet, and shouldn't they be arguing about the role of the SelwayBitterroot, the role of the Bob Marshall, the role of the greater
Yellowstone ecosystem, the conservation, the fauna for the Northern
Rockies. They're not doing it. So they're not matching scale with issue
and information. So until the organization changes in its thinking, I think
it will remain bogged down in a very slow and cumbersome process (PI6
Grizzly 276, 286).
PI explains that a problem with natural resource planning is that management and
planning is not performed at the "ecosystem" scale and there is little consultation and
coordination between public land agencies that share management responsibilities in
similar regions.
As far as science or total resource use, we said we wanted to do regional
planning. Or we said we wanted to do ecosystem management but there
are few examples of that and less concrete success stories. That is
something that is beyond the scope of a GMP but the critical issues, at
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least for some species, particularly grizzly bears or other large carnivores
is going to be ecosystem-wide and we don't have a handle on that. You
could say you want to do that all you want, but if they build that gold mine
in southern B.C. it's going to have tremendous impact on grizzly bears;
more than if we built another wing on the hotel on Lake McDonald or
something like that. So you're talking about putting these threats in
perspective and there is one tendency to say, "I want to work on things
that I have under my control," but then there is a whole other tendency to
say, "we need to really solve the problem." ...In reality, whether that road
is repaired or not isn't going to address the bigger issues like wildlife
conservation or other issues like spread of noxious weeds, external threats
fi-om pollution. And that is one of the frustrations that people on my staff
said, "this is all about the facilities, this isn't about everything else." ...The
Forest Service, they'll consult with us on certain things, but there's no
overall plan. And they have a different mandate. They're managing for all
these different things and, they don't have any more control over private
land than we do, so that gets frustrating because there can't be a common
goal totally because we're a National Park and a National Forest, and that's
still a frustrating thing (PI Glacier 188, 195, 237).
This last example of a planner who feels that problems exist on a systemic level is
illustrated by PI5 who explains that the public must realize that "they too, in essence, are
government" and must become involved with government.
I wish the public would realize that they too, in essence, are government,
because government's created for the public, and the public seems to be
really quick to say, "jeez, the government, what are you guys doing?"
Well, we're doing what you guys have asked us to do. You've asked us to
provide a service for you so we're trying to move forward to provide that
service for you, but yet then you're very critical of that service we provide
(PI5 Blackfoot 153).
Systemic-level problems, according to the majority of planners, exist to varying
degrees and are affecting or impeding the planning process. Planners explained that these
systemic-level problems include the xenophobia that exists in rural communities, a lack
of public interest in natural resource issues, the institutional culture of land management
agencies acting with a specific agenda, a mismatch of scale with information and issue
and the lack of ecosystem-based management and interagency coordination and
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cooperation. Ultimately, according to one planner, the public must realize that "the>' too.
in essence, are government" (PI5).

Summary of Working Propositions
Table 8 summarizes the results of the seven working propositions used in this
study. Working Propositions 2 and 5 are supported, Working Propositions 1 and 7 are
not supported and Working Propositions 3,4 and 6 are not testable for various reasons.
Working Proposition 2 is supported and provides evidence to suggest that a
planner who perceives scientism as inadequate is more likely to prefer models of
planning other than synoptic. In addition, Working Proposition 5 is supported and
indicates that a planner who feels that public participation should be encouraged is more
likely to prefer models of planning other than synoptic.
With regard to Working Propositions 3 and 6,1 determined that to varying
degrees, all of the plaimers (100%) perceived the planning environment as inflexible (WP
3) and recognized that goals were contested (WP 6) and thus the test statistic could not be
run because the variable was constant. For Working Proposition 4 (Irmovation
Rewarded), the proposition was not relevant to certain planners that I interviewed
because these individuals were not involved in an institutional setting in which reward for
actions taken was a significant issue (i.e. landowners, members of NGO's). With many
of the remaining planners, it was not possible to discern whether they perceived the
planning environment as one that rewards innovation because of ambiguous or unclear
statements. Thus with a small sample size, the statistical test was not performed. The
tests for Working Propositions 1 and 7 were not significant because the distribution of
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planners who perceive the planning environment as impeded by procedural obligations
and who perceive problems as existing on a systemic level was not commensurate with
the distribution of synoptic and transactive planners. Thus, these data did not present
convincing evidence to support the two working propositions.

Table 8. Summary of Working Propositions.
Working Proposition

Result

WP 1: A planner who perceives the planning environment as impeded
by procedural obligations is more likely to prefer models of planning
other than synoptic.

Not Supported

WP 2: A planner who perceives scientism as inadequate is more likely
to prefer models of planning other than synoptic.

Supported

WP 3; A planner who perceives the planning environment as inflexible Not Testable
is more likely to prefer models of planning other than synoptic.
WP 4; A planner who perceives the planning environment as one that
rewards innovation is more likely to prefer models of plaiming other
than synoptic.

Not Testable

WP 5; A planner who feels that public participation should be
encouraged is more likely to prefer models of planning other than
synoptic.

Supported

WP 6: A planner who recognizes that goals are contested is more likely Not Testable
to prefer models of plarming other than synoptic.
WP 7; A planner who perceives problems as existing on a systemic
level is more likely to prefer models of planning other than synoptic.

Not Supported
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

Findings
This research reveals that perceptions of the institutional envirormient of sampled
planners involved in several large-scale natural resource planning processes vary
according to the process in which planners operate and include themes relating to
mistrust, power, the practical utility of the final product (planning document), and
constraints relating to time and fimding. Other more positive themes that emerged relate
to dialogue, creativity, trust, respect and learning. In particular, the majority of planners
in this study perceive the natural resource planning environment as one where procedural
obligations constrain the process (92.9%), goals are not identified or agreed upon
(100%), institutional arrangements are inflexible (100%) and where problems regarding
natural resource planning and management exist on a systemic level (92.9%).
I interviewed twenty-eight individuals involved with four natural resource
planning processes in the northern Rocky Mountains and found that several distinct
themes became evident from the examination of the data. The analysis of the study areas
focuses on the categorization of comments made by planners that relate to dominant
themes that emerged from each of the planning processes.
With regard to the Bitterroot Ecosystem Grizzly Bear Recovery Process, the
dominant themes relate to the perception that the working envirorunent was impeded by
procedural obligations and that there existed problems associated with goal identification
or agreement. The process is based in a large geographic area possessing a great deal of
variety from both a social and biophysical standpoint. In addition, the process includes a
national interest that seemed to have added to the complexity and controversy. Only two
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of the nine planners interviewed in the Grizzly process felt that the process was not
constrained by procedures. Several of the planners who felt that the process had been
constrained by procedural obligations explained that the mandatory public hearings were
not only unhelpful, but were in some cases dangerous because of threats of violence. In
addition, some planners explained that the content analysis process conducted after public
meetings, hearings and scoping sessions was problematic illustrating the difficulty of
quantifying value-based, qualitative information and introducing emotional information
into a synoptic planning process. Every planner with the Grizzly process felt that goals
had not been identified or agreed upon and thus, made for a contentious planning
environment. While the groups who worked together (ROOTS) in this process to submit
an alternative for grizzly bear recovery established that trust could be achieved by certain
stakeholders with seemingly dissimilar objectives and represents a positive step forward
in complex nattiral resource planning situations, a dominant theme regarding all of the
various stakeholders of the process is mistrust. Planners described the elements of
mistrust both at public gatherings required by the process and in non-work settings. Trust
presumably fomented as a result of the mandate of the ESA to recover bear populations
stressing the "how" rather than the "if" The inability to challenge the goals of the plan
(i.e. to focus on if bears should be reintroduced) was not an option after the Interagency
Grizzly Bear Committee endorsed the area for recovery in 1992 and presumably led to
the resulting mistrust.
The dominant themes of the Glacier National Park General Management Plan
include power, goal identification or agreement, the practical utility of the final product
and mistrust. As with the Grizzly process, the Glacier process is based in a large
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geographic area possessing a great deal of variety from both a social and biophysical
standpoint and includes a national interest that seemed to have added to the complexity
and controversy. Several of the plarmers in this process explained that they felt
controlled and expressed frustrations associated with working in an environment where
decisions would be made regardless of their input. Other planners discussed the notion of
wanting to control the process because the public doesn't "have time to understand the
depth of what we're trying to do" (P2). Power as a dominant theme was present only in
this process. The power held and used by these individuals produced a grievous working
environment and caused several of the planners to drop out of the planning process.
Correspondingly, planners who chose to exercise power and "temper" (P3) public
opinion with their management skills caused strife because of this air of omniscience.
Every planner in the Glacier process discussed the inability to identify or agree upon
goals as a constraining factor. Most notably, this was directed toward upper management
who some planners claim would dictate goals that were not widely held by planning team
members or would change the goals throughout the process. Several planners questioned
the utility of the General Management Plan and Final Envirorunental Impact Statement
that resulted from the Glacier process and whether the plan would just "rubber-stamp"
(P3) what has been or what will be done in the park. As with the Grizzly process,
mistrust was a significant issue that planners discussed regarding relationships with the
public and relationships with other planners on the park planning team.
Planners involved with the Steering Committee of the Upper Clark Fork River
Basin Management Plan discussed issues relating to dialogue, trust, respect, creativity
and leaming. It appears that many of the outcomes are components that characterize the
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fundamental tenets of social capital. The Clark Fork process is spatially-based
(recognizing bioregional constraints) and focused explicitly on the riparian corridor of a
watershed. In addition, all interest groups reside within and are intimate with the
planning area. According to many of the planners, these interest groups were able to
share both experiential (indigenous) knowledge and technical (science-based)
information and more importantly over time, were accepting of both types of knowledge.
The process was inclusive and allowed for complete control by stakeholders in both the
methods and outcome of the plan. The Steering Committee produced a management plan
that was ratified by the 1995 Montana legislature and continues to meet to the present.
While the Steering Committee was not able to address the complex issues associated with
Superfund cleanup of the Upper Clark Fork River basin, members appear to have
developed trust and mutual respect that allowed for and promoted discussions of other
natural resource issues in the basin. Questions relating to the implications for the fish and
other biotic components related to the Upper Clark Fork River basin remain unanswered
since a drought has not occurred in the region and the leasing component of the
management plan has yet to be used. However, relationships cultivated during the
writing of the Upper Clark Fork River Basin Management Plan could translate into the
ability to initiate actions and collectively solve related natural resource problems in the
future.
Planners associated with the Blackfoot River Recreation Management Plan
identified issues relating to procedural obligations, inflexibility due to time and funding
constraints and goal identification or agreement. As with the Clark Fork process, the
Blackfoot process is focused on the riparian corridor of a watershed and includes all of
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the interest groups that reside within the planning area. All of the planners interviewed in
this study area commented that the process has been constrained to varying degrees by
procedural obligations. The adequacy of scoping meetings was discussed by several
plarmers both in questioning the agency's interpretation of issues that resulted from the
scoping meetings and the overall representation of the general public. Several planners
also discussed time and money constraints and the naivete in judging the funds necessary'
to complete the project. All of the planners in this study area recognized that goals were
either not adequately identified or were not agreed upon and some expressed concern
over trying "to capture the essence of what was going on out there, and obviously that
was probably our perception, not necessarily the world's perception" (PI 5). Since the
process is on going at the time of this study, it is not possible to comment on the outcome
of the process. However, planners appear to have recognized the above-mentioned
constraints to plarming and are taking specific actions to mitigate the issues early in the
process. For example, many of the planners in this study area agreed that the creation of
the Recreation Steering Committee provided an exceptional opportunity for involving all
interested stakeholders in a deliberative manner. In addition, many planners explained
that the Recreation Steering Committee would recognize many forms of knowledge and
diversity of opinion and thus would confront issues associated with goal identification or
agreement.
It is interesting to note that several of the dominant themes were common to
particular study areas. For instance, the common dominant theme of the Grizzly, Glacier
and Blackfoot processes was goal identification or agreement; the common dominant
theme of the Grizzly and Blackfoot processes was procedural obligations and; the
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common dominant theme of the Grizzly and Glacier processes was mistrust. Yet. these
themes were not dominant in the Clark Fork process. It is also interesting that several of
the dominant themes were exclusive to only one of the study areas as was the case of
power in the Glacier process and dialogue, trust, creativity, respect and learning in the
Clark Fork process. It appears that there exists some association with a process that
allows for two-way dialogue to take place and flourish as perhaps allowing for goal
identification or agreement to be discussed and resolved and promoting a sense of trust
among stakeholders. Similarly, if issues relating to procedural obligations were resolved,
then perhaps dialogue and the resulting characteristics of social capital could exist and
flourish. Another distinguishing characteristic of the Clark Fork process is the fact that
stakeholders initiated the process and were not subject to the rigid procedural obligations
that accompany the NEPA process. In the case of power issues present only in the
Glacier process, it is perhaps a function of the institutional structure of the National Park
Service (and not the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service or Montana Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks) in which the Park Superintendent and Division Chiefs control much
of the park decision-making process.
Another component of the results of this study are the relationships between the
numerous themes that emerged from these data. Regarding funding, several planners
commented that when goals are not agreed upon or identified early in the process, total
costs of the planning process can be greatly increased. In addition, several planners
explained that procedural obligations, such as the public hearing process mandated by
NEPA, can actually become a greater liability in terms of the total costs, the creation of
an exclusionary atmosphere and the potential for litigation. One planner commented that
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funding could be related to trust in that stakeholders may be suspect of a process that is
fimded by an agency that has a mandate. Another planner explained that total funding
was not a barrier to planning but rather the allocation of funds within the organization.
Dialogue or communication is another subject that is interrelated to different
themes is this study. Several planners discussed issues related to procedural obligations
affecting dialogue because the "documents are not intelligible to a lot of people" (PI 7).
These data also show that mistrust and power appear to either cause or become inflated
due to a lack of dialogue. In addition, inflexibility within the organization was discussed
as not allowing dialogue to take place on a regular basis. The last interrelated theme
includes the identification that time was necessary to allow for goal identification or
agreement because "you don't really imderstand what you're doing in a plan until you're
well, well into it" (P5). It appears that when dialogue is suppressed, goal identification or
agreement becomes a moot objective. Thus, the promotion of dialogue appears crucial
toward resolving "wicked" problems.
The resulting synthesis of the working propositions is a more conceptual way of
approaching a planner's perception of the planning environment. This research shows
that a plarmer who feels that public participation should be encouraged and a planner who
views scientism as inadequate is more likely to prefer models of planning other than
synoptic. Systemic-level problems associated with natural resource planning were
described by nearly every planner and include public apathy toward natural resource
issues, xenophobia that exists in rural communities, the current dysfimctionality of
ecosystem-scale management, poor interagency coordination and the structure of the
agency that does not match scale with issues and information. In addition, nearly every
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planner perceived the planning environment to be constrained by procedural obligations,
inflexible to innovative approaches, and contentious due to a lack of goal identification or
agreement. Since five of the seven working propositions were not supported, it can be
inferred that the worldview of the planner is not predictive of the type of planning model
preferred by the planners and tends to obscure the accurate characterization of a planner
as being strictly synoptic or transactive. Ironically, while most planners recognize that
they are constrained by various issues, they continue to apply synoptic models that are illsuited to dealing with "wicked" problems.
Recognizing that broad generalizations are often neither accurate nor legitimate in
inherently complex and heterogeneous natural resource planning processes,
interpretations are based on the group of individual plarmers involved in the particular
process within which they are operating. The interpretations are not meant to reflect the
entire population of natural resource plarmers or prevalent paradigms that exist in natural
resource planning. However, several comments and interpretations consistent between
the study areas may provide valuable insight into the intricacies of other planning
processes, therefore several broad generalizations will be made. In summary, most of the
sampled planners recognize the following:
1. The planning process tends to be constrained by various limitations
and impediments associated with procedural obligations,
2. The planning environment tends to be inflexible toward
accommodating innovative approaches,
3. The planning environment tends to be adversely affected by a lack
of goal identification or agreement,

4 Scientism, the belief that science is inherently capable of solving
almost all human problems, is not an appropriate foundation from
which to base natural resource decisions,
5- Many of the problems that adversely affect natural resource
planning exist on a systemic level.
More broadly, this research provides evidence that,
1. The recognition by planners that the planning environment is
impeded by procedural obligations, institutional inflexibility, goal
identification or agreement or systemic-level problems is not
necessarily predicative of the type of planning model espoused by
the planner (i.e. a planner's worldview is not indicative of behavior),
2. Synoptic planning models used in agency-led, landscape-scale
planning processes tend to contain many constraints and lead to a
contentious plaiming environment and,
3. A process that allows for two-way dialogue, the recognition of the
legitimacy of many forms of knowledge, a decision-making process
based on consensus, meetings that are regular and open to all
stakeholders and based on a bioregional approach (that incorporates
a community of place in contrast to a community of interest) will
tend to produce a planning environment that promotes trust, respect,
creativity and learning.
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Therefore, planners who recognize these themes are more likely to accommodate
a diversity of stakeholders and produce an outcome with less potential for dispute and
litigation.
The research exposed details regarding the planner's perception of the situations
in which they operate by identifying the aforementioned themes. More tenuous,
however, is the imderstanding of the relationship between the perceptions of these
situations and the choice of planning model. While this research does suggest a
correlation between worldview and desired plarming model in the case of the role of the
public and the use of science in natural resource planning, as exemplified by a lack of
support for the majority of the working propositions, a planner's perception of the
planning enviroimient is not widely commensurate with his/her desired model of
planning. Thus, this research illustrates that there is no clear, linear, cause and effect
relationship between a planner's desired model of planning and the planner's worldview
and that an intricate and complex amalgam of variables are present regarding the
planner's perception of the planning environment and the choice of planning model and
include power relations, systemic-level problems and the muhiple legal, political,
institutional and social barriers that are perceived to exist in contemporary natural
resource planning.

Limitations
The limitations of this study concem the following three items; nomothetic-level
conclusions from the working propositions; tautological implications of comparing the
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variables regarding public participation and scientism with the desired planning model
and; the total number of sampled planners.
As mentioned in Chapter Two; Conceptual Framework, the testing of working
propositions provides for a limited understanding of these data. By classifying a planner
as only "transactive" or "synoptic," rich detail regarding the nuances and idiosyncrasies
of what it means to be "transactive" or "synoptic" are lost. Similarly, categorizing an
individual as wholly "encouraging public participation" diminishes and obscures richness
of detail regarding why an individual feels the public should be encouraged and what is
meant by "encourages." While generalizations can consequently be made regarding all of
the "transactive" or "synoptic" planners who feel that "public participation should be
encouraged," these results tell us little about the substantive idiosyncrasies that are so
crucial in vmderstanding the planner's paradigm toward natural resource planning. As
Patterson and Williams (in review) assert with regard to tests of hypothesis or
propositions, "(T)he fundamental tension underlying this methodological decision reflects
a tradeoff between relying on knowledge generated by prior research versus remaining
open to what is new, unique, or unexpected in the current research context. ...the cost is
that the potential insights from a given study are limited to the rigid boundaries defined
by the operational model or the hypotheses/propositions being tested." Thus, the
quantitative methodology that provides for a more statistically generalizable description
of natural resource planning has in this study been juxtaposed with a qualitative,
interpretivist approach to imderstanding the complex envirormient in which natural
resource planners operate. In this regard, I also recognize the limitations of this
qualitative approach but assert that what is impaired in the interpretation of data that are
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not statistically generalizable, is made up for in conveying a message that represents a
range and diversity of viewpoints that carries with it richness of detail.
Second, there exist certain tautological implications associated with the testing of
several of the working propositions. This issue concerns Working Proposition 2
(Scientism Inadequate) and Working Proposition 5 (Public Participation Encouraged).
After reviewing the literature more thoroughly, tautological implications with comparing
these two variables to the "Desired Model" variable were noted. For instance, a planner
who feels scientism is inadequate yet exhibits qualities of synoptic planning is
contradictory. Likewise, a planner who feels that the public should be encouraged
throughout the planning process is a quality of a transactive planner. In instances when
these contradictions became evident, a planner's desired model was categorized as
"Undetermined," thus decreasing the sample size.
Lastly, while the sample size of twenty-eight planners provided adequate
coverage of a diversity of opinion for the analysis of the study areas and working
propositions, a larger sample could provide even greater diversity of opinion and richness
of detail and could have contributed more evidence to generalize to the population of
natural resource planners. However, due to time constraints of this research, increasing
the sample size was not possible.

Implications and Recommendations
While there is little research that has specifically tested or analyzed planner's
perception of the planning environment, planners associated with these study areas and
planners operating in related natural resource planning processes could benefit from
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examining and applying these data when constructing a planning process or reforming a
process that is already in progress. Planners should be encouraged to learn from the
"mistakes" and "lessons" of others by incorporating the results from this research in the
following three ways.
First, realizing the issues that have constrained the natural resource planning
processes in this study, planners could avoid many of the frustrations and conflicts that
have preceded them by understanding issues that result in similar planning processes and
applying new techniques that encourage a deliberative and inclusive atmosphere with the
public. In addition, realizing the issues that have constrained other natural resource
plaiming processes could provide for greater communication and functionality with other
planners.
Second, planners could benefit from the results of this study by realizing that in
many cases, investing in additional time necessary to involve interested stakeholders
using deliberate and meaningful methods may actually lead to long-term financial
savings. In addition, procedural obligations such as those associated with F ACA or
NEPA that simply "go-through-the-motions" of including stakeholders, can actually
increase the amount of money and time spent on a planning process or potential for
litigation. Planners should be cognizant that promoting public involvement could
advance a sense of community solidarity and social capital and lead to improved
environmental policy in the long-term.
Lastly, planners will still have to realize that since systemic-level problems
underlie the contemporary natural resource planning environment, a transactive planning
approach will not work in all natural resource planning processes under the present public
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land management and planning system. Planners should realize that deficiencies and
constraints exist within the planning environment (such as those outlined in this
research), including the scale of various planning processes and the institutional
dysfunctionality of many contemporary planning processes. In addition, planners should
take deliberate steps toward improving the planning environment and promote more
functional methods that account for both the biotic and social components of natural
resource planning. Ultimately, all of the stakeholders involved in various natural
resource planning processes that exhibit "wickedness" will have to examine the current
paradigmatic assumptions that control the processes and the scale at which analyses are
conducted and decisions are made. Recognizing these three issues, I recommend the
following course of action.
First, federal, state and other public agencies involved in natural resource
planning should build mechanisms that promote learning into existing processes. This
learning should focus not on the compartmentalization of problems and issues but rather
on interdisciplinary and holistic understanding of social and biotic interactions and
involve systems-thinking that recognizes the interrelatedness of external forces and the
operationalization of issues as an interfunctional group. Cooperating agency agreements
should be sought that encourage interagency collaboration and mutual learning and
institutional structures should be designed that recognize and encourage innovation and
provide rewards and incentives to managers and planners who attempt irmovative
approaches to natural resource planning, especially those that involve multiple
constraints. Financial support and effective utilization of funds at all levels of natural
resource planning should be sought and would only strengthen long-term planning.
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conservation and restoration efforts. The devolution of authority and decision-making
power to local communities in certain natural resource planning situations should be
attempted on a trial basis as "case studies" and "pilot projects" to gauge or illustrate the
effectiveness of new forms of planning including collaborative, consensus-based
approaches. More effective training of managers and citizens in citizenship techniques
should become a priority not only of civil servants working in the public interest but
should also begin early in childhood development and involve the entire citizenry. The
demarcation and reauthorization of public land administrative boundaries and
management districts based on a bioregional approach should be investigated as an
appropriate action toward more effective natural resource management. Lastly, the
definition of success should be more than simply the implementation of a plan. Success
can and should be defined as the ability to control the future in which setting goals and
achieving them are part of the same process and should include the increased potential for
social capital, trust and a sense of collective identity and solidarity. These issues are also
measures of success and should not be discounted.
Ultimately, changes will have to involve a convergence of both top-down reform
and grass-roots populism in order to address the more systemic-level issues that pervade
the foundations of western culture including the institutional structures that underlie
education, politics, economics and general social welfare in order to instill a sense of
civic responsibility, community solidarity and altruism among the populace.
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Future Research
Individuals involved in future research should recognize the inherent complexit>
of natural resource planning and the unpredictability of cause and effect relationships
when attempting to analyze the perceptions that planners hold of the planning
environment in which they operate. Moreover, future research should favor and focus on
qualitative methods and interpretivist paradigms that are context-based and focus on the
holistic understanding of the phenomenon seeking to represent the diversity of
viewpoints in rich detail instead of utilizing a reductionistic or multivariate approach.
Since the data presented in this study show that there is not a predictable relationship
between the worldview (perceptions of procedural constraints, role of the public, etc.)
and the behavior (planning model chosen by the planner) of the planner, future
researchers should recognize that this phenomenon is far more complex than can be
represented by quantifiable variables that assume a stable, predictable and pre-determined
relationship between causes and effects.
Future research that could add to these findings include further analysis of natural
resource planning processes at various spatial and temporal scales and under diverse
decision-making arrangements. Most notably, future research could analyze a greater
diversity of natural resource planning situations (in both spatial and temporal scales) in
order to determine whether similar themes are present and the dimension and depth of the
similarities and differences. Analyzing additional study areas and comparing various
planning scales including other terrestrial and riparian planning processes, could
strengthen the discussion presented in this study and expand an understanding of the
paradigms of natural resource planning. Further expansion of this type could include
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county-level planning, urban greenway planning, rural community problem-solving and
diverse recreation-related planning issues and would add to the paucity of research on
this subject. Further research regarding the recovery of endangered species at various
scales and using various planning models including a transactive approach could also
expand the discussion in this study.
Furthermore, questions and issues relating to the devolution of power and
decision-making authority for the people who are intricately linked to their proximal
environment will be paramount in the future. Further research into the emerging
literature and phenomenon regarding bioregionalism would strengthen the argument that
planning based on watersheds and other geographical characteristics tends to be more
inclusive of stakeholders and may reduce the potential for conflict.
Ultimately, future research must address the intricate relationship between spatial
and temporal scales of analysis and the social and biophysical context of the process
including questions relating to the scale at which natural resource decision-making is best
accomplished. Recognizing the dynamic, stochastic and often conflicting social and
biophysical processes inherent in most natural resource planning situations, fundamental
questions regarding the mechanisms that promote a more transactive approach in natural
resource planning appear to be most relevant in the future.
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APPENDIX A
Interview Guide

1. Can you describe the process used to develop this plan thus far? How have you
arrived at the current situation?
2. Can you review your role in this planning process? How long have you been
involved? Have you been involved since the beginning of the process?
3. Was there general public acceptance about the goals at the start of the plan? What
kinds of people disagreed with the objectives of the plan? How much power did they
hold? To what extent did definitions of problems exist in the beginning of the
process? Did people generally agree on the definitions of these problems?
4

In what capacity do you feel the public should be involved in the planning process?
What kind of information can they contribute? How do you know when there has
been enough public involvement? How does including the public affect the planning
process?

5. Did issues come up during the planning process that you were not expecting? How
did you deal with these issues? Do you generally feel that you are constrained by
deadlines or money? How did these constraints affect the outcome?
6. What should the role of science in planning be? Were there disagreements among
scientists (both within or outside the agency) about cause and effect relationships?
How did this affect the process?
7. Can you describe what happens when you personally do something different,
unexpected or innovative during the process? Do you have incentives to try new or
innovative approaches during the planning process?
8. Did regulatory or procedural issues affect this planning process? What aspects of
NEPA contributed to positive aspects of the process? What aspects of NEPA made
the process more difficult?
9. How do you treat the issue of decisions made in the present on future generations?
How would you refine or correct issues relating to your planning situation if you
could?
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APPENDIX B
Acronyms
BE
BLM
CFR
CMC
CIG
DEIS
DFWP
DSC
EA
EIS
ESA
FACA
FEIS
GMP
GNP
MCA
MDFWP
NEPA
NFMA
NGO
NLI
NPS
P
RecSteerCom
ROOTS

use
USFS
USFWS
VERP
WP

Bitterroot Ecosystem
Bureau of Land Management
Code of Federal Regulations
Citizen Management Committee
Citizen Involvement Group
Draft Environmental Impact Statement
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks
(MT)
Denver Service Center
Environmental Assessment
Environmental Impact Statement
Endangered Species Act
Federal Advisory Committee Act
Final Envirorunental Impact Statement
General Management Plan
Glacier National Park
Montana Code Annotated
Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and
Parks
National Environmental Policy Act
National Forest Management Act
Non-Governmental Organization
Northern Lights Institute
National Park Service
Planner
Recreation Steering Committee
Resource Organization on Timber Supply
Unites States Code
United States Forest Service
United States Fish and Wildlife Service
Visitor Experience Resource Protection
Working Proposition
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